Index by Editors,
INDEX.
ABATEMENT. See Anntsr, 2. ERRORS AND ArlEALS, 3.
ACCOMPLICE. See CRIMINAL LAw, 11, 12.
ACCORD.
Payment of a check, given and accepted in settlement of an indebtedness of
larger amount, is a good accord and satisfaction. Goddard v. O'Brien, 637,
and note.
ACCOUNT. See EQUITY, 3. PATENT, 11.
ACNOWLEDGMENT.
1. Is valid if made before officer defacto. Sharp v. Thompson, 68.
2. Is insufficient when it does not show that the instrument was executed fer
the "purposes" therein expressed. Ford v. Barks, 343.
1. AMarried woman's acknowledgment duly certified is prima facie but not
conclusive evidence against her, except as to a bona fide vendee vithout notice
as to whom she is estopped to deny an acknowledgment actually made. Bolt
v. Moore, 342.
4. Certificate of officer cannot be impeached except by proof of fraud or
conspiracy, and the testimony of the grantor alone is not sufficient to overcome
the certificate and the officer's testimony in support thereof. Fitzgerald v. Ftz-
gerald, 67.
5. In the absence of fraud a certificate of acknowledgment cannot be
impeached by merely negativing the facts therein stated. k-tao.ch v. Hath-
awro, 197.
6. In order to defeat the title of an innocent purchaser by impeaching such
certificate the evidence must be so clear as to exclude every reasonable doubt.
Id.
ACTION. See BAIL3tINT, 3. CONTEMIPT, 2. CORPORATION, 23. DEBTOR AND
CREDITOR, 22. HUSBAND AND WIFE, 5. INSURANCE, 9, 22. MORTGAGE,
24. NEGLIGENCE, 1. PExsio-,. TORT.
1. For obstructing a public right no private action will lie, except for dam-
ages differing in kind as well as degree from those suffered by the general
public. CUIcago v. Union Budlzdig Assoc., 479.
2. The fact that property owners bave been specially assessed as benefited
by the opening of part of a street, gives them no equitable ground to enjoin its
vacation. Ird.
3. A court of equity is not fettered by the rule as to local actions, and the
assignee of a covenant for title to land in Louisiana may maintain in Missis-
sippi a bill to obtain reimbursement for expenditures made in resisting a suit
and extinguishing, a paramount title. Olic,; v. Love, 600, and note.
4. Sernble, such asignee might also have maintained a suit at law for money
pail out and expended for the use of the covenantor. Id.
5. Whether an action for damages for an injury to laud situated out of the
state may not be maintained in the courts of Mississippi, qure. Id.
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1802, April 29.
1870, July 14.
1872, May 10.
1872, July 1.
1874, Revised Statutes.
Sect. 614.
Sect. 639.
Sect. 693.
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Sect. 916.
Sect. 1008.
Sect. 2330.
Sect. 2331.
Sect. 3220.
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Sect. 3408.
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1874, June 6.
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March 3.
INDEX.
See ERRORS AND APPEALS, 10.
See TAX, 5.
See MINES, 1.
See ERRORS AND APPEALS, 10.
See E xRORS AND APPEALS, 8.
See REMOVAL OF CAUSES, 4.
See ERRORS AND APPEALS, 10.
See UNITED STATES COURTS, 1.
See UNITED STATES COUR TS, 4.
See ERRORS AND APPEALS, 16.
See UNITED STATES, 2.
See UNITED STATES, 2.
See TAXATION, 11.
See TAXATION, 11, 12.
See TAXATION, 10.
See AD-MIRALTY, 9.
See ADMIRALTY, 8.
See AD31IRALTY, 7.
See AD.MIRALTY, 7.
See SHIPPING, 3.
See SHIPPING, 2.
See SHIPPING, 2.
See NATIONAL BANE, 2.
See NATIONAL BANK, 1.
See NATIONAL BANK, 3.
See CRIMINAL LAw, 22.
See MINNES, 1.
See ADMIRALTY, 3.
See REMOVAL OF CAUSES, 3.
ADMINISTRATOR. See EXECUTOR.
ADIIRALTY. See ATTACHmNT, 3, 4. ERRORS AND APPEALS, 4.
I. Jurisdiction.
1. Has jurisdiction of suit by one who, expecting a consignment, boards a
vessel upon her arrival and is injured by the fall of bales negligently stowed.
Leathers v. Blessing, 747.
2. A writ of prohibition will not be granted to restrain an admiralty court.
from proceeding in a cause instituted to recover damages for loss of life occa-
sioned by a collision. Ex Porte Gordon, 267.
3. The Act of Congress of February 16th 1875, confining the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to questions of law, is constitutional. Dun-
can v. Steamship Francis Wrighd, 747.
4. The refusal to find a fact, or the finding of one not supported by any evi-
dence, may be brought up by bill of exceptions, provided that the fhet be an
ultimate one and not a mere incidental piece of evidence, but in such case the
testimony necessary to establish the exceptions should appear in the bill. Id.
II. Collision. See NEGLIGENCE, 2, 3.
5. Upon a libel for collision libellant may recover damages for the loss of the
use of his vessel while undergoing repairs, and if she was fitted for a par-
ticular business the average net profits, of her trips may be adopted as the
measure of damages. Steamboat Potomac v. Cannon, 677.
6. A vessel was insured on two-thirds of her valuation, under an agreement
that in case of loss the insurers should be entitled to the same proportion of the
damages recoverable from any other person therefor. A loss occurring by
collision the insurers paid their two-thirds, and then assigned the owners of the
other vessel all tleir interest in the damages. Half damages having been
recovered against the latter vessel, held, that one-third of the sum paid by tile
insurers must be deducted from the amount to be recovered. Id.
INDEX. 819
ADMIRALTY.
III. Liabilitg of Ship-owners.
7. A vessel owner may institute proceedings to obtain the benefit of thelimitation of liability secured by sections 4284 and 4285, U. S. Rev. Stats.,
without waiting for a suit to be begun against him or his vessel. Ex parte
Sloyoa, 543.
8. The Limited Liablility Act of Congress does not apply to boats on streams
connecting the great lakes. C, ddy v. Horn, 302.
9. The Limited Liability Act of 1851, reproduced in sects. 4283, &c., Rev.
Statutes, applies to owners of foreign as well as domestic vessels, and to acts
done on the high seas, except when a collision occurs between two vessels of
the same foreign nation, or, perhaps, of two foreign nations having the same
maritime law. Naot. Steam Nar Co. v. Dyer, 479.
10. Shipowners may avail themselves of the defence of limited liability by
answer or plea. Id.
11. If the owners plead the statute, a decree may be made requiring them
to pay the limited amount into court, and distributing said amount pro rata
among the parties claiming damages. Id.
12. It is not necessary for the owners to surrender the ship. They may
plead their immunity, and abide a decree for the value of the ship and freight.
1,.
13. The rule of damages for goods lost on the high seas is their value at the
place of shipment, with all charges of lading, insurance and transportation,
and interest at the rate of six per cent. per annum, but without allowance for
anticipated profits. If the goods had no market value at the place of ship-
ment, other means of ascertaining their value may be used, such as their usual
price at the port of destination, with a fair deduction for profits and charges. Id.
IV. lorfirne Lieas.
2IAnnRTxin LiENS, 1, 81, 145.
ADVANCEMENT.
Loose declarations of a parent are not sufficient to change a debt secured by
a legal instrument into an advancement. Harley v. Harley, 480.
AGENT. See ATvon-,Py. BANK, 2. Bmts AND NOTEs, 1, 11. BzoIEnR.
CRIINAL LAv, 5. INFANT, 1. INsurtA-,cE, 8. Punias PoLic. TELL-
GREx, 9. Tnov rn, 1.
1. An architect employed to superintend the building of a house, erected
under a written contract with the owner, has no authority to order extra work,
nor will the fact that the owner received from the builder a statement of this
extra work without making objection estop the owner from afterwards object-
ing. Starklweother v. Goodman, 267.
2. A real estate broker who assumes to act for both parties in an exchange
of lands, cannot recover compensation for both without showing full knowledge
of and assent to the double compensation, but when such consent is shown, he
may recover from each party. Bell v. McConnell, 135.
3. Authority to sell property and take note does not include authority to
receive payment of the note after delivery to the principal. Draper v. Rkce,
416.
4. Where the holder of a bill of exchange deposits it with a bank for col-
lection, the correspondent of the bank, to whom the bill is forwarded, becomes
his agent, and is directly responsible to him for negligence. ueliclh v. Irat.
State B n of Burliagton, 543.
5. An agent to sell has no implied power to agree to pay commissions to
another. Atlee v. fink, 678.
6. Fraud of, committed in line of employment, renders the principal liable.
Hopkins v. Hawkeye 1ns. Co., 748.
7. Where one signs a check as agent, and the party with whom he deals has
full knowledge of his ageucy, and of the principal for whom he acts, the omis-
sion of the principal's name from the check will not render the agent person-
ally liable. Metcoff v. hVillias, 134.
8. Notice to bank director while not engaged in the business of the bank
not notice to the bank. Fairfield Savcigs Bank v. Chase, 68.
INDEX.
AGENT.
9. Knowledge of agent obtained prior to his employment, is notice to the
principal when it is so fully in mind that it would not have been forgotten, and
so material as to create a duty to disclose it. Fai:field Savings Bank v. Chase, 68.
10. Upon a purchase by an agent where the vendor is ignorant of the ageny,
or knowing of the agency, is not informed as to who is the principal, he may
elect to make the principal his debtor, and is not debarred from such election
ly having taken the promissory note of the agent for the goods. 3errill v.
Kenyon, 198.
ALIMONY. See HUSBAND AND WIFE, 6-10.
ALLEY, See VENDOR AND VENDEE, 9.
APPLICATION OF PAYMENTS. See LDIITATIONS, STATUTE OF, 7.
SUrtETY, 10.
APPORTIONMENT See LIFE TENANT.
ARBITRATION.
An agreement in a contract to submit all differences thereunder to arbitra-
tion is a good defence to a suit by either party, but such defence is waived by
a failure to plead the agreement. Alford v. 'Tiblier, 198.
ARREST.
1.. Parties and witnesses in any legal tribunal are privileged from arrest on
civil process during their attendance, and for a reasonable time in going and
returning, and this protection extends to parties and witnesses attending before
arbitrators, commissioners or examiners. Larned v. Grifffn, 672.
2. This privilege can be enforced by plea in abatement. Id.
3. The privilege is not waived either by giving a bail bond or by filing an
answer to the merits with the plea of abatement. Id.
ASSAULT. See CRIMINAL LAW, II.
ASSIGNMENT. See DEBTOR AND CREDITOR, 17, 19. LANDLORD AND TEN-
ANT,3. PARTNERSHIP, . PLEDGE, 1-3. SURETY1 . VENDOR AND VEN-
DEE, 10.
ASSUMPSIT.
Indebitatus assumpsit lies to recover the price of an article delivered on a
written order, and in such case the writing is admissible evidence. Gibson v.
Vail, 77.
ATTACHMENT. See ATTORNEY, 6. CONFLICT OF LA-ws, 1. -CORPORATION,
3, 6. DEBTOR AND CREDITOR, 21. ESTOPPEL, 1. PARTNERSHIF, 1. SALE,
2. STOPPAGE IN TRANSITU.
I. A foreign corporation is liable to garnishment, and service of process may
be made on its agent. Ran. 6 St. J. Railroad v. Crane, 480.
2. An executor or administrator is not subject to garnishment before a final
order for the distribution of the estate is made. Case Threshing .3lachine Co..
v. Jliracle, 420.
3. Where wages of a seaman are attached, and the owners are compelled by
admiralty proceedings to pay such wages, they will not be charged as trustees.
Eddy v. O'Harra, 807.
4. Whether wages of a seaman on a coasting voyage are subject to attach-
ment. Qua-re. id.
5. Garnishee cannot contest the validity of the original judgment because of
failure to comply with all the provisions of the Code. Cottan v. Lowvry, 68.
6. In foreign attachment where the answer of the garnishee shows no indebt-
edness at the time of the attachment, the court has no jurisdiction, although the
garnishee admits an indebteduess at the time of answer. Morris v. Ueion
Pacific Railroad, 420.
7. In trustee process plaintiff may put interrogatories to the trustee calculated
to elicit facts which will tend to charge him, but not to contradict or impeach
him. alutter v. Frainiagham 4- Lowell Railroad Co., 345.
8. An attaching creditor cannot maintain an action to redeem land covered
INDEX.
ATTACH2IENT.
by his attachment from a mortgage executed by the debtor. Fish er v. Tall-
maa, 345.
9. A plaintiff has no greater rights against the garnishee than the defendant
would have had. l|oldron v. lWilcox, 346.
10. Au order by a court of one state requiring a debtor to the defendant in
a judgment recovered therein to pay the debt to the plaintiff, will be recognised
by the court of another state if the debt so ordered to he paid is in the cutody
of the latter court, but not if the moneys are in the hands of a corporation of
the latter state which had not been summoned in the proceedings. Elizabeth-
towa Saw. Int. v. Gerber, 615.
11. Whether moneys can be attached in one state in the hands of a litigant
in the courts of another state when the time for pleading on the part of such
litigant has expired. Qi'a-e. Id.
12. A statute authorized an attachment where the debtor had fraudulently con-
veyed his property, and also where lie had fraudulently concealed or di-
posed of it : Held, that the word " d isp sed" did not include any alienations
covered by the other sections of the statute, and that a charge of fraudulent
disposal was not proved by evidence of a fraudulent mortgage. Ballene v.
S:ith, 73.
ATTORNEY. See CaDINxAL LAw, 18. LIBaL, 4. A.lxcious POSEOUTION,
2. SLT-Or, 1.
1. Compromise by, without the knowledge of the client, is invalid, but the
leaning of the courts is in favor of upholding such compromise if fairly made.
lVIdpql, v. lldlitison, 475.
2. The a'sent of the equitable party to the compromise is sufficient without
the assent of the legal party. Id.
3. A compromise by an attorney, of a wife's suit, with her consent, will not
lie set aside upon the petition of the husband filed a year afterward. Id.
4. Has no power to compromise a cause although his client lives in another
state. Gra, q r v. Butchldcr, 678.
5. Has no power to compromise claims, but a ratification of such a compro-
mise may be inferred from acquiescence of the client or from other circum-
stances. 1'tiheif v. Boslck, 343.
6. May release an attachment of property and such release will bind his
client a agaiust an innocent purchaser. Benioa v. Caw, 416.
7. Cannot be summarily disbarred for a libel on the judge not designed to
influence the exercise of his judicial functions. Ex parte Steinuan, 616.
8. Attorneys engaged jointly in a suit are as to that suit partners and divide
equally the compensation, and neither has any remedy against the other for
failure to pertorm his full duty. Htmn'y v. Bassatt, 678.
9. The proper scope of the right to charge a retainer is to compensate coun-
sel for the loss of the opportunity of being employed by the other side. Mc-
Lelan v. Ho'lfe,-d, 69.
10. There is no such general custom to charge retainers as would justify a
binding in-truction that they were a legal charge in such case. Id.
11. When there is an express agreement or a particular fee the client should
be credited thereon with an allowance to the attorney, decreed by the chancellor
in equity proceedings to be paid to the attorney out of the estate. Shreve v.
R-einimoz, 678.
12. An agreement to prozecute an action for one-half the amount recovered
in ca~e of succes, and for nothing in case of failure, is void for chaiperty,
and the ilient max recover from the attorney the whole amount recovered, less
the cost- paid. Achirt v. Bar'',-, 543.
13. Women are entitled to admission to the bar under a general statute not
confined in terms to the male sex. In re .MIarZ Hall, 728, and note.
BAILMENT.
1. A hailee cannot acquire title to the property adverse to that of his bailor
through a tortious seizure and sale of the property by a third person. Enos v.
Cole, 134.
2. Moneys paid by the bailce at such a sale without authority from the bailor
cannot be recovered from the latter. Id.
INDEX.
BAILMENT.
3. The property having returned to the bailee, the bailer cannot, without
proof of actual damage, maintain an action against such third person as for a
conversion. Enos v. Cole, 134.
4. An artisan has a lien for work done on property whether under an
express agreement for a stipulated price or an implied contract for reasonable
compensation, and if several articles are included in one contract, lie has a lien
on each for the work done on the whole. Hensel v. N~oble, 616.
BANK. See AGENT, 4. 8. CONTRACT, 11. CORPORA-TION, 3, 4, 5, 27. ExEc-
UTORS, 7. NATIONAL BANK. TAXATION, 10, 16-19.
1. Is not liable for a failure of duty on the part of a notary in whose hands
it has placed for protest notes sent to it for collection. Britton v. N\icolls, 544.
2. Has no lien upon moneys deposited by one as agent with notice to the
bank of the principal for debts due by the agent, even though the agent some-
times deposited his own moneys in the account and drew checks for his private
use. Cent. Nat. Bank v. Connecticut Mut. Life lns. Co., 68.
3. The certification of a check by the bank on which it is drawn is equivalent
to an acceptance, and the bank may be sued thereon by any holder. Louisiana
Ice Co. v. State Nat. Bank, 135.
4. When a bank receives on deposit checks or notes, the deposit is usually
for collection only, and the depositor may revoke the bank's agency. Id.
5. A depositor is not bound by the rules of a clearing house to which the
bank belongs. Id.
BANKRUPTCY. See CORPORATION, 22. DEBTOR AND CREDITOR, 11.
1. A subscription to the stock of a corporation is a debt which is barred by
a discharge in bankruptcy. Morrison v. Savage, 342.
2. Assignee allowing bankrupt to continue suit in his own name, is bound
by the judgment. Thatcher v. Rockwell, 807.
3. New promise by bankrupt, after adjudication and before discharge, is
binding. Knapp v. Hoyt, 807.
4. An assignee in bankruptcy cannot maintain a bill to compel the execution
of an agreement among secured creditors not affecting the general estate.
Dudley v. Easton, 135.
BILL OF EXCEPTIONS. See ADMIRALTY, 4.
1. Should not contain the charge in ful but only the parts necessary to point
the exceptions. United States v. Rindskopj; 748.
2. The signature of the judge should be withheld until the bill is freed from
irrelevant matter. Id.
BILL OF LADING. See ComttoN CARRIER, 4.
When given by a master or shipping agent for goods not received, is void in
the hands of a subsequent bonafide purchaser. Pollard v. inton, 544.
BILL OF REVIEW. See EQUITY, 17.
After decree on the merits and remittitur, an appellate court has no juris-
diction to entertain a bill of review. Putnam v. Clark, 616.
BILLS AND NOTES. See CItEcK. EvrDENCE, 9. Exxcuons, 4. LisnrTA-
TIONS, STATUTE or, 2. LUNATIc, 1. PARTNERSHIP, 18, 21. PAYMENT,
1. SURETY, 5. USURY, 2, 3
I. Form, consideration, 4-c.
1. Where a bill is signed, "Bellville Nail Mill Co., A. B., Prest., C. D.
Secy.," the officers signing are not individually liable. Hitchcock v. Buchanan,
679.
II. Rq/ts of parties.
2. That a third party holds a negotiable note for a valuable consideration
will not of itself deprive the maker of defences valid against the payee. It
must appear that the note was purchased in the usual course of business or for
its face value. Millard v. Bartom, 807.
3. Maker cannot show payment to third party in accordance with contempo-
raneous parol agreement differing from terms of note. Draper v. Rice, 417.
INDEX.
BILLS AND NOTES.
4. Possession of note by personal representative of payee, is primafixcie evi-
dence that it is not paid, and throws on maker the burden of proving payment.
Ritte v. Shecl,, 267.
5. Payment of interest on note in ignorance of his rights will not estop
maker from proving prior payment in full. Id.
6. The seller of note does not warrant the solvency of the maker. Day v.
Kinneg, 267.
7. A note given under threat of suit, and in settlement of a claim known to
both parties to be fraudulent, is void in the hands of a third party who was a
general purchaser of the payee's notes, and knew of his dishonest methods of
obtaininm them. Onabee v. Howe, 679.
S. In a suit betveen the parties to a note, the defendant may show by parol
want of failure of consideration. Lngersoll v. M1lartin, 74S.
9. It is not as a matter of law neiligence for the maker of a note to trust to
the agent of the payee to read it correctly. Hopkins v. Hwkeye Ins. Co., 748.
10. A statute requiring the defendant's denial of signatures to a written
instrument to be by plea verified by affidavit, does not apply to a case where
defendant claims that the instrument is on its face the contract of his principal
and not his own. Hitchcock v. Bchawnaa, 679.
III. radors,,zrent, Acceptance, 5J-e.
11. An acceptance of a draft drawn byan agent is a guarantee of the agent's
authority as to innocent holder., but not as to the party who first received the
draft and who was bound to have made inquiry. Agnel v. Ellis, 198.
12. The acceptance by a creditor of a note of his debtor, or of a third person,
is not presumed to be in payment of the debt, but as collateral security or con-
ditional payment. Hoitr v. Moore, 514, md note.
13. If conditional payment, it is necessary to inquire what the condition was,
and if not fulfilled, whet injury has resulted from the breach. Id.
14. A creditor transferring such note to his creditor by delivery only, is not
relieved by the failure of the creditor to give him notice of non-payment unless
actual damage results therefrom. 1.
15. Nor by acceptance by the creditor from the maker of the note of a draft
subsequently protested. Id.
16. Accommodation endorser liable to one who takes the note as collateral
for an antecedent debt. Pitt v. Folg song, 417.
17. Blank endorsement will be construed to give effect to the intention, and
may be explained by parol. Ow,,iaqg v. Baker, 69.
18. Third party endorsing before payee may avoid the presumption that he
is liable as joint promissor by proving a different understanding of all the
parties, payee included. M4.
19. If a note payable to order be transferred without endorsement,the trans-
ferree cannot sue in his own name. State v. High Bridge M. E. Ch. Asso.,
679.
20. Third party signing note after delivery incurs no liability thereon.
M1cMaihn v. Geger, 69.
21. One si,,ning a note after others, without explanation as to the character
in which they have signed, may assume that they are joint makers, and he will
beconw liable as surety or guarantor for all ; but whether surety or guarantor
is not decided. Id.
IV. Peeoentalt, 6'c.
22. The drawer of a draft is discharged by the acceptance by the payee of
the drawer's check, and a failure to present such check until a day after it could
have been collected. Fernald v. Bnsh, 544.
23. Where a notary is unable, after diligent inquiry, to ascertain the address
of the drawer of a draft, he may direct the notice of protest to him at the place
where the draft was drawn or dated. Page v. Valery, 135.
BOARD OF TRADE.
Nature of right of membership in. Nlote to Swith v. Barclay, 408.
BOND. See OrrICER.
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BRIBERY. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 4. CRIMINAL LAW, III.
BROKER. See AGENT, 2. CUSTOr, 1. ESTorrEL, 2.
1. Is entitled to compensation when he finds one who makes a written con-
tract of purchase or sale with his employer. Veazie v. Parker, 69.
2. It is no part of his duty to advise as to the terms of the contract or
explain its words. 'Id.
3. Conversations between buyer and seller before and after the contract not
admissible to affect his compensation. Id.
BUILDING ASSOCIATION. See CORPORATION, 16.
BURDEN OF PROOF. See CRIMINAL LAW, 1, 28-30. DEBTOR AND CREDITOR,
6. HUSBAND AND WIFE, 11. LUNATIC, 5. NEGLIGENoE, 4.
CANAL. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 5.
CASES AFFIRMED, COMIENTED ON, OVERRULED, ETC.
Allen v. Merchants' Bank, 22 Vend. 215, disapproved. Brittoa . NiVcolls,
544.
Arimond v. Green Bay and M. Canal Co., 31 Wis. 316, distinguished.
Black River Imp. Co. v. La. C. Boomnng and Trans. CS., 424.
Boxborough v. Messick, 6 Ohio St. 448, distinguished. Pitts v. Foglesong,
417.
Boyd v. Mosely, 2 Swan 660, distinguished. Mississippi 3ills v. Union and
Planters' Bank, 534.
Cook v. Corthell, 11 R. I. 482, explained and distinguished. Carpenter v.
Scott, 551.
Cumber v. Wane, 1 Str. 426, commented on. Goddard v. O'Brien. 637.
Davis v. Brown, 94 U. S. 423, distinguished. Martin v. Cole, 73-.
Day v. Baldwin, 34 Iowa 380, distinguished. Kerdt v. Porterfield, 548.
Delaplaine v. C. and N. W. Railway Co., 42 Wis. 230, distinguished.
Black River Imp. Co. v. La. C. Booming and Trans. Co., 424.
Dorchester, &e., Bank v. New England Bank, I Cush. 177, followed.
Britton v. sVicolls, 544.
Frazier v. State, 23 Ohio St. 551, approved and followed. 3clitugh v.
State, 618.
GaA" v. Flesher, 33 Ohio St. 115, 453, approved and followed. Rowland v.
Mweder Fur Co., 617.
Henning v. U. J. Ins. Co., 47 Mo. 425, distinguished. Baile v. St. Joseph
F. and M. Ins. Co., 37.
King v. Nichols, 16 Ohio St. 80, approved. Dawson v. The State, 421.
Lewis v. Railroad Co., 59 Mo. 495, followed. Hall v. Alo. Pac. Railroad
Co., 485.
MIrrison v. Hancock, 40 31o. 564, overruled. Deardorff v. Everhartt, 348.
Niles v. Gray, 12 Ohio St. 320, followed. Pratt v. Sinlon, 269.
Railway Co. v. 'Cumminsville, 14 Ohio St. 524, approved. Scioto Valley
Railroad Co. v. Lawrence. 422.
Ross v. Epsy, 66 Pa. St. 483 dissented from. Martin v. Cole, 73.
Susquehanna Bridge Co. v. Evans, 4 Walsh. Cir. Ct. Rep., dissented from.
11artin v. Cole, 73.
A Remark in School District v. Zink, 25 Wis. 636, overruled. Williams v.
Williarms, 619.
Vyne v. Glenn, 41 Mich. 112, distinguished. Backley v. Headley, 109.
Williams v. Briggs, 11 R. I. 476, explained and distinguished. Carpenter
v. Scott, 551.
CAVEAT EMPTOR. See JUDICIAL SALE, 1.
CHAM3PERTY. See ATTORNEY, 12.
CHARITY.
I. Bequest to "benevolent associations of this city for the benefit of white
and colored children "is void for uncertainty. The Henry JVatsou Childrens'
Aid Soc. v. Johnston, 748.
2. A gift of a fund to establish and maintain a school of learning is a char-
itable trust. Taylor's Ex'rs v. Trustees of Bryn Mawr College, 70.
INDEX.
CHARITY.
3. A court will not administer a foreign charity, but where su, h charity is
valid and the trustees have eapacify to receive the fund and administer it, the
court will order its payment to them. Taylor's El.,s v. Tvistees of Bryn
Latr College, 70.
4. A trust to employ the income of moneys for the relief of the most deserving
poor of a city forever, without regard to color or sex; but no person who is
known to be intemperate, lazy, immoral or undeserving, to receive any benefit
from the said fuu.!, with a power of appointing and substituting trustees for
those named, is a valid charity, and will be executed. Hesl eh v. Aturphy,
659.
5. What trusts will be supported as charities. Id., Nrote.
CHATTEL MORTGAGE. See MoRa.c , II.
CHECK. See AccowD. AGENT, 7. BANK, 3, 4. BILLS AND NOTES, 22.
GIFT, 6.
The mere fact that the holder of a check received it when eight days over-
due does not render his title subject to the equitie. between the drawer and
payee, but it is a question for the jury whether the check was taken under cir-
ciastances which should have excited suspicion, and the fact that it was eight
days overdue is evidence on that question. London, 6'c., Bnk. v. Groone, 770,
and notk.
CITIZENSHIP. See RE1MvAL OF CAUSES, I.
CITY. See lMUNICIPAL Conpor.ATION.
COLLATERAL SECURITY. See PLEDGE.
COLLISION. See ADMtIrLTY, II.
COM ITTEE. See PAaTmEnsdIm, 6.
COLMON CARRIER. See RAILROAD, 1, 2.
1. Is liable for safe carriage of baggage checked to point beyond its own line
for pas engers travelling on coupon tickets. Lonisrille - ANtasille Railroad v.
W1cavor, 748.
2. The liability of a railroad company as a carrier ceases when the freight is
deposited in a warehouse, and is not extended by a statute requiring notice to
the consignee. B,,tler v. Rdlrad (b., 70.
3. Though a railroad stipulates that it is not to be responsible for attention
to live stock, yet if it carries the stock beyond their destination it is liable for
loss by want of such attention while they are detained. Bryant v. &wntavestern
Railroad, 343.
4. A general stipulation in a bill of lading will not limit the liability of a
common carrier, nor will an express contract protect him from the results of
his own nejigence. Gi,,rfqla R. S- B. Co. v. Gana, 267.
5. Wher, -oods are shipped over connecting lines the last road receiving
them in good order is liable to the consig-ne for damages. Id.
6. The receipt of goods fbr transportation without exception is impliedly a
receipt as in good order, and renders the carrier liable for any in jury. Id.
7. In the aleence or' special contract a common carrier is not liable for loss
of the _oods after delivery to the next succeeding carrier on a through route,
nor will snteh contract he implied from the fact of an arrangement among the
carriers fir a stipulated toriff for the whole route to be apportioned among
them. St. Lods I,. Co. v. St. L., Vt. 4-" L Railroad Co., 136.
COMION LAW'.
1. A statute adopting the common law of England does not require the
courts to entorce the local customs of that realm. /Hon. 4' St. J. R-olroad v.
Crone, 4:80.
2. ADOPTION OF, BY TIuE Asirmc '- COLONIES, 553.
CONDITIONAkL SALE. See DEBToR AND CREDITOR, 4, 5. SALE, 1, 3.
CONFESSION. See CRIAINAL L.Aw, 3.
VoL. XXX.-104
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CONFLICT OF LAWS. See ATTACHMENT, 10. EVIDENCE, 10. HUSBAND
AND WIE, 1, 3. REnetVanR, 4. U.NITED STATES COURTS, 5
1. Where the rolling-stock of a railroad is attached by unsecured creditors
in one state pending an application fbr a receiver in another starh by creditors
secured by a mortgage covering the road and its equi, ments, the receiver sub-
sequently appointed may, under the comity between states, assert his right to
the stock by an action in his own name in the state in which it was attached.
Merchants' .Nat. Bank v. .Mcteod, 617.
2. The state courts will respect as valid a judgment of a federal court
against a county on its bonds, notwithstanding the same bonds are held by the
o state courts to be void. State v. Rainey, 480.
3. A state will not recognise the right of inheritance of an adopted child
under the laws of another state in which the adoption took place, if, under its
own laws, no such right exists. Keegan v. Geraldy, 198.
4. As azoinst an adopted child, a statute regulating descents should be
strictly construed. Id.
CONSIDER-ATION. See CONTRACT, 6, 12.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. See AD3IIRALTY, 3. CIttINAL LAw, 18. DE-
SCENT, 2. INTOXICATING LIQuoRs. MUNICIPAL CORPOI.ITION, 1, 12, 16.
TAXATION,'l, 3, 7.
Powers of Legislature.
1. The legislature may pass a Statute of Limitation for suits on existing
causes of action, provided that a reasonable time be given before the bar of the
statute commences. Town of Koslkonong v. Burton, 548.
2. If intere'st on interest be allowed by the local law at the time of the con-
tract, that right cannot be taken away by a subsequent legislative declaration
as to what was the intent of the statutes prescribing the rate of interest in force
at the time the contract was made. ld.
3. An act to compromise the bonded indebtedness of a state, which provides
for the issuing of new bonds, the coupons of which shall be receivable in pay-
ment of all taxes and debts due the state, except for taxes for the school hund,
is unconstitutional, and the officers of the state may, at the suit of a tax-payer,
be enjoined from issuing such bonds. Lynn v. Polk, 321, and note.
4. The courts cannot enjoin the execution of a statute because of alleged
bribery of members of the legislature to pass it. Id.
5. A state leasing surplus water from a caemal, reserving the right to resume
the privilege when not necessary for navigation, is not bound to maintain the
canal for the benefit of the lessees after it has ceased to be needed for naviga-
tion, and a statute abandoning it is valid. Fox v. incinati, 417.
6. A statute as to peddlers' licenses, which discriminates against the pro-
ductions of other states, is void. State v. McGinniss, 417.
7. The legislature may enlarge or diminish the powers of a county and vary
its boundaries. It may, after part of the territory of another county- has been
added to it, require payment of part of the latter's debt, and may direct how
the debt shall be ascertained. Pulasti County v. County Judge of Sabine County,
417.
8. A statute making the notorious character of the premises, or the intem-
perate character of persons frequenting the same, or the keeping of the usual
implements of tippling shops, prinafacie evidence that liquors are kept on the
premises for sale is unconstitutional. State v. Beswick, 199.
9. Statutory provisions whereby different classes of property are listed and
valued for taxation in different modes, are not necessarily in conflict with a
constitutional provision that all property shall be taxed by a uniform rule and
according to its true value. ll'agoer v. Loonis, 423.
10. Where a statute enacts that every act of incorporation shall be subject
to repeal, such right of repeal becomes part of every subsequent charter.
Greenwcood v. Union Freight Railroad Co., 481. -
11. After such repeal a corporation can originate no new transactions which
could not be exercised by unincorporated persons. Id.
12. The rights of the shareholders to the property of the corporation, and
rights of contract and choses in action are not destroyed by such repeal, and if
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the legislature has providea no specific mode of enforeing such rights, the courts
will do so by the means within their power. Grenwood v. Union Freight Rail-
road Co., 481.
13. So far as the property or franchises of the old coi poration were necessary
to the public rise, the legislature could authorize a new corporation to take
them on makin, due cotapensation. Id.
14. A statute which, under a reserved right, repeals an act of incorporation
and creates a new corporation with simlar powers, the use of which requires
the eerise of eminent domain, is not unconstitutional if it provides for com-
pensation ftr the property of the extinct corporation so taken by the new
one. if.
15. The imposition by a state upon every telegraph company doing business
within its borders, of a tax on every message, i, unconstitutional a, to mes-
sages sent out of the state, and as to messages of the federal government.
Ieist(ea Uama Tel. (Co. v. State of Tetas, 544.
16. A statute imposing a penalty upoa " every person vilho shall keep a place
in which it i- reported that intoxicating liquors are kept for sale, without hav-
ing a licens, therefor, " is unconstitutional. State v. Kaatz, 544.
17. Legislation which does not violate any constitutional prohibition may be
retroactive, but such construction is not favored by the courts. Do,s v. Caz-
entre, 544.
18. Where the title of an act gives notice of only a part of the matters con-
tained therein, it is valid as to such part and void as to the residue. Diechon t
v. City of Allegh azg, 617.
19. Where a statute authorizes a township to convey a farm within its limits
to a city, and declares that the farm should remain liable to taxation by the
township, such power of taxation may be repealed. State v. W1illiamison, 679.
20. A dechration in a general law that all acts or parts of cts incosnsistent
with it are repealed, will repeal inconsistent provisions in prior special acts. Id.
II. Powvers of the Jvdiiary.
21. The courts will not interfere with the exercise of a discretion vested by
law in any executive officer of a state, but where the discretion has been law-
fully exercised by the legslature, the courts will compel the obedience of such
officer thereto. State of Louisiana v. Jamd, 1.36.
22. A proceeding to compel the state auditor to disobey the instructions of
the state to distribute the state funds is an action against the state, which, by
reason of its sovereignty, will not lie. .d.
IlI Eminent Domain.
23. Where the construction of a railroad in a street will work material
injury to the abutting property, such construction may be enjoined until pro-
ceedings are instituted for the appropriation of private property according to
law. &ioto 'dal. Ra;lrold v. Low,-,ace, 422.
24. Authority given to a railroad to build upon or across any highway, with
a stipulation that the highway shall ic restored to its former state, or so as not
to impair its usefulnes, does not authorize a use to the exclusion of ordinary
travel thereon. P., Ft. 1V - C. tailroad v. Reich, 201.
CONTEMPT.
1. After a rule against a sheriff to pay money has been made absolute, le
cannot be attached for non-compliance, without a rule to show cause. Mize v.
Barscki, 8o8.
2. A Justice of the peace cannot commit to prison for non-payment of a fine
for contewpt where the judgment imposing the fine does not provide for impris-
onment ; and he is liable in damages for such commitment. Lmpiplher v. Deweol,
543.
CONTRACT. See B.%NxinupTcy, 3. CORPORATxox, 7. EVIDENCE, 1, 3, 4, 9.
G'.UAaN,.y. INFANT. LuN TIC. MXSTER AND SnERVANT, 1, 2. PunLic
POLICY. SuILRItF'S SALt, 1.
1. The signature of the party to be charged is not neepssary to the validity
of a written contra't not within the Statute of Frauds. Bacon v. Tmrrt, 136.
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2. An agreement between the parties to a contract and a third person whereby
one party is released from the obligations of the contract, and the third person
substituted, is a novation, and requires no further consideration than such re-
lease and substitution. Bacon v. Titus, 136.
3. A clause in a contract of sale that the measurement shall be by a person
named is obligatory in default of fraud, and a simple averment in an answer
that the measurement is not correct will not warrant the introduction of evi-
dence to contradict or amplify the contract. Dauner v. Otis, 200.
4. In a suit on a stockbroking contract evidence is admissible to show the
meaning of the words " on margin" in the business, and if it appears that the
contract was not one for the mere payment of differeices, but for the actual
purchase of stock it is not a gaming contract. Hatch v. Douglass, 199.
5. The custom of stockbrokers to debit and credit interest monthly, comput-
ing interest on balances, does not necessarily involve usury. But if it did it is
only a question of its allowance by tile courts and does not affect the contract
for the purchase of tile stocks. Id.
6. A. sold goods to B. taking in payment the standing wood on a farm held
by B. Of this wood the amount brought to market by A. only paid the outlay
for cutting and hauling, and the trade with B. was made pending equity pro-
ceedings which involved the title to the farm and which resulted adversely to
B. Held, that there was a total failure of consideration, and that A. could
maintain assumpsit against B. for the value of the goods. Peckham v. Kiernan,
199.
7. A contract containing the words "we promise to pay," and signed by
two persons describing themselves respectively as "president school board" and
"secretary school board." but which contained no reference to any school dis-
trict: Held, to be the personal obligation of the signers, and that they could
not show by parol evidence a contrary intention. Wing v. Glick, 545.
8. Upon a sale of merchandise to be delivered in successive parcels, the pur-
chaser may rescind for non-delivery of one. ANorriigton v. Wright, 395, and
note.
9. The vendor in such cases cannot insist upon the contract being treated as
severable, for the purpose of avoiding the right of rescission. Id.
10. The right of rescission is not waived by an acceptance of a portion in
ignorance of a default as to the remainder. Id.
II. A guaranty of a third person upon a note given by a director to a bank
for an indebtedness prohibited by the bank's charter is void and cannot be re-
covered upon. Workingmen's Banking Co. v. Raatenberg, 680.
12. A release on payment of part of debt is nudum pactam, but if under seal
the seal imports consideration. Ingersoll v. Martin, 749.
13. A promise to pay made after a release is not binding. Id.
14. A., owning a railroad, informed B., who was using it, that lie would
thenceforth charge $2 per car. B. replied that he would not pay it, and con-
tinned to use the road : Held, that A. could only recover the reasonable valse
of the use of the road. Curtis v. Ciers, 749.
15. A. owed B., and C. owed A. : by agreement of the three, C. gave his
note to B., and was substituted in place of A. as B.'s debtor. C. was insolvent
at the time, but this fact was unknown to all the parties. Held, that the loss
fell on B. Cadens v. Teasdale, 70.
16. A contract provided that certain logs purchased should be measured in
accordance with the scale in general use on Muskegon Lake. Held, that the
scale in use at the time of measurement, and not that in use at ie time of con-
tract, was tie one intended. Hackley v. Headley, 109.
17. On an issue to determine whether services were rendered gratuitously by
a son-in-law, there was evidence that the parties lived together on the father-
in-law's land ; that the father-in-law said lie expected to live there all his
days : that the land was to be his daughter's when he died, and that he intended
to pay his way. Held, sufficient to warrant a verdict in favor of the son-in-
law. James v. Cummings, 808.
COPYRIGHT.
1. The deposit of two copies of the copyrighted publication with the librarian
of Congress, must be proved in an action for infringement. Me-rill v. Tice, 344.
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2. A memorandum of such deposit upon a copy of the record of the title
page certified by the Librarian of Congress, is not competent evidence thereof.
,1ri ill v. Tice, 394.
3. Whether the certificate of the librarian, under his official seal, that the
books had been deposited would be competent evidence, qure. Id.
CORPORATION. See ATTACILMENT, 1. BA,;i.RUPrcy, 1. BILLS AND
NOTES, 1. CONSTITUTIosAL LAw, 10-14. CONTRACT, 7. INSURANCE,
13. MUNICIPAL CORPORAxTION. PARTNERSHIP, 5. RECEIVER, 8. RE-
MOVAL OF CAUSES, 1.
1. An ouster of a corporation de facto from its franchises, is no defence to a
suit by a creditor against stockhoblers to enforce payment of their stock sub-
scriptions. Rwnrland v. Macder Fur. Co., 617.
2. Corporations defacto and de jute stand on the same footing as respects
their liability to creditors. ia.
3. Where a corporation unjustifiably refuse- to make a transfer on its books,
an etual transfer by delivery of the certificate is good as against an attaching
creditor without notice. jcclcltant.s' Nat. Banlk v. Richards, 344.
4. A statutory provision that no stockholder indebted to a bank shall transfer
his stock may be waived by the cashier, notwithstanding the fact that be is a
member of thc firm which owns the stock, if there be no collusion. Cecil 'at.
Ba,d v. lMatontoni Banl, 545.
5. Such lieu may be lost by a transfer of the stock on the books of the bank
without the issuing of a certificate to the trausferree. Id.
6. A creditor to whom stock had been transferred on the corporation books
as collateral security, subsequently on payment of the debt endorsed the certifi-
cate to another creditor at the request of the debtor. Before this transfer was
made on the books the stock was attached as the property of the debtor. The
by-laws provided that "all transfers of stock shall be made in the books of the
company." Hed, That the attachment could not be sustained. Beckwith v.
Brcughs, 200.
7. An executory contract between a manufacturing corporation and one of
its stockholders for the purchase of the latter's stock by the corporation, cannot
be enforced. Coppia v. Greente(.c 6- Row o Co., 618.
8. It is beyond the powers of a railroad, or of a corporation chartered for the
manufacture and sale of musical instruments, to guarantee the payment of the
expenses of a musical festival. Dris v. Old Colony Railroad Co., 545.
9. The fact that the use of a wharf by a railroad company as a public wharf
is 
t
ra virce, is no ground for an injunction at*tbe suit of one whose only
interest is that as lessee of an adjoining public wharf he will be injured by the
competition in business. New Orleans, 31. and T. Railroad Co., Y. Elierman,
618.
10. A railroad company has an implied power to borrow money, and may
do so by a perpetual loan secured by irredeemable bonds sold at a discount,
and entitling the holder, upon a contingency, to a share in the profits in addi-
tion to interest. P die, and Reading Railroad Co., v. Sticquer, 713, and note.
11. Where the bank account of a corporation is overdrawn upon checks
signed by the president and secretary, there is a presumption in favor of the
officers' authority which will support an action against the corporation in the
absence of affirmative proof of the want of such authority. Mahoney Mi,,.
Co. v. Anglo-California Bank:, 100.
12. General presumption as to authority of officers of corporations. Id.,
noe.
13. A bill by a stockholder against the corporation and a third party to
protect the interests or enforce the rights of the corporation will only lie in
cases of unauthorized, illegal or oppressive action of the board of directors or
of a majority of the stockholders in violation of the rights of the other stock-
holders. Ha'ces v. Coatca Costa Water Co., 25-2.
14. Complainant must allege in the bill his ownership of stock, his efforts to
obtain redress and the bonafide character oF the suit. Id.
15. A director may become a creditor of the corporation, but is not thereby
divested of his responsibility as a director, and a sale under a mortgage held
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by him will be set aside upon slight evidence of maietfides. Hallam v. Indian-
ola Hotel Co., 443, and note.
16. The director of a building association who has executed a mortgage to it
for a loan cannot, in foreclosure proceedings, set up as a defence a secret
agreement with the other directors that the loan was to be repaid by full pay-
ment of his shares of stock. Pangborn v. Citizens' Building Association, 618.
17. An agreement to guarantee the stock of another corporation is not a
guarantee to the individual purchasers of the stock of the other corporation,
although a memorandum of it is endorsed on the certificates. Flagg v. Man-
hattan Railway Co., 775, and note.
18. A release of such guarantee by the directors of the corporation to which
it was made is valid if made in good faith. Id.
19. Such release will not be set aside because some of the directors voting
were also stockholders in the guarantor corporation, if without their votes a
majority of the directors present voted for the release. Id.
20. Where the amount of the capital stock of a corporation is limited by
charter, all stock issued in excess of the limit is void. Scovill v. Thayer, 481.
21. A holder of such stock is not entitled to the rights or subject to the
liabilities of a holder of authorized stock. Id.
22. An agreement between a corporation and its stockholders that no
further assessments shall be made on its stock which is not fully paid, is void
as to creditors, but proceedings in the interest of the creditors to set aside the
agreement is a prerequisite to suits by the assignee in bankruptcy of the cor-
poration to recover the unpaid subscriptions. Id.
23. Where a question concerning the right of the member of an order to
benefits has been decided by a tribunal of the order to which the member
referred it in a method prescribed by the by-laws, such decision is a bar to an
action at law for the same cause. Osceola Tribe v. Schmidt, 482.
24. Assets of a corporation are a trust fund for payment of its debts, and
may be followed into the hands of a purchaser with notice, and a purchase by
a director is presumed to be with notice. Jones v. Arkansas Mechanical (
Agricultural Co., 749.
25. Such purchase is not void but voidable. Id.
26. The assets of an insolvent corporation are not turned into a trust fund
by the mere knowledge of its officers of its insolvency. Comfort v. MeTeer, 70.
27. Where after knowledge of such insolvency the officers entered a credit
to a customer which was justified by the course of dealing with him, a subse-
quent assignee of the bank for the benefit of creditors is bound thereby. Id.
28. DISRANCHISE. NT PnOl PIvATE CoRORTIONS, 689.
CORPSE.
1. Cannot be disposed of by will, and no action lies against the executors for
the expenses of cremation performed under directions in the will. Williams
v. Williams, 508, and note.
2. It is the duty of executors to bury the body, and they are entitled to its
possession, and possession obtained for the purpose of cremation under a license
given with the understanding tint the body was to be buried is illegal. Ad.
COSTS. See ATTORNEY, 11. ERRORS AND APPEALS, 11. JUDGIENT, 4.
TRUST, 3. WILL, 8, 16-18, 21.
1. Where one ceestni que trust has carried on litigation for the common benefit
he will be allowed out of the trust fund his counsel fees and legal expenses, but
not his private expenses. Trustees of Int. Imp. Fund v. Greenough, 680.
2. The practice of allowing evtravagant counsel fees and.commissions out of
trust funds disapproved. Id.
CO-TENANTS. See Ric ivEnns, 9.
COUNTY. See MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
COURTS. See MUNICIPAL EoN-Ds, I.
Jurisdiction of inferior courts can be collaterally attacked. Culver's Appeal,
268.
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COURT MARTIAL. See HABE.s Conrus, 2.
COVENANT. See ACTION, 3. JUDICIAL SALE, 2.
No special form of words is necessary in order to charge a party with
covenant, but it must appear from the whole instrument that there was an
agreement on the part of the person sought to be charged to do or not to do
some act. Hale v. Fared, 200.
CRIMINAL LAW. See ERRORS AND APPEALS, 12. LIBEL, 1, 2.I. Gcneratll.
1. When an alibi is relied upon, the burden is on defendant to establish it
by a preponderance of the evidence. State v. Hamilton, 808.
2. The right of a prisoner to appear in person and defend may be waived
by him, and if lie voluntarily abandons the court room, and refuses to appear,
the court is under no obligation to stop the trial. Sadl i)er v. Pofple, 482.
3. A confe sion, not induced by promises or threats, is admis'ible notwith-
standing that it was obtained by artifice by the officer in charge of the prisoner.
State v. Ph',Ips, 482.
4. A defendant may be convicted of violation of the Sunday law by proof
of the acts of his employee done with his knowledge and acquiescence. Seawan
v. Cowmmtaw altd, 245.
5. Liability of principal for criminal acts of agent. Id., nwte.
6. report made by witnes of defendant's statements at the inquest, and
used by him to refresh his memory on the trial, is not admissible in evidence.
Comanoawaltd v. Jfls, 808.
7. Mere proximity of a husband, not actually present, will not raise a pre
sumption that the wife acts under his coercion. State v. Shee, 546.
8. Any inference of coercion from such proximity is a question of tibt. Id.
9. One who has formed an opinion is prima facie incompetent as a juro
and cannot be accepted, until it appears that his opinion was from mere news-
paper statements or rumor and that it will not prevent him from rendering an
impartial verdict. MlcH?'gh v. State, 618.
10. It is not an abuse of the court's discretion to admit a juror who says that he
has formed an opinion on rumor, -which it would require evidence to remove, but
that lie has no bias and can try the case impartially. Casey v. 7e State, 418.
11. An accomplice who is not indicted, or is separately indicted, is a com-
petent witness, though convicted, if he has not been sentenced. 1d.
12. The declarations of an alleged accomplice, in the absence ofthe defendant,
are not admissible against him until other evidence than that of the principal
is produced implicating the declarant in the offence. Id.
13. The wife of one who is jointly indicted vith defendant is not a competent
witness for him. Id.
14. Requiring the jury to retire during the argument of instructions is a
matter of practice within the discretion of the court. Id.
15. A new trial will not be granted upon after discovered evidence which
might by reasonable diligence have been had on the trial, or which is in its
nature impeaching only. Tcbin v. Pople, 200.
16. The rules with regard to petitions for new trials, for newly discovered
evidence in civil cases, apply to criminal cases, although in capital cases the
court will be more inclined to give the petitioner the benefit of any doubt raised
by the new evidence. Hanida v. The State, 200.
17. It is one of these rules that the evidence must be sufficient to change the
result if a new trial should be had. d.
18. TnE RIGHT TO COUNSaa IN A CRIM1INAL CASE, 625.
II. Assawdt.
19. In an indictment for asault and battery, the act must be alleged to
have been done unlawfully, and such allegation is not supplied by an allegation
of rude, insolent, or angry touching, but it is not necessary that the word
"unlawful" should be used if another term of the same import is employed.
State v. Smith, 193, and note.
III. Briber..
20. Bribery at a municipal election is a misdemeanor punishable aLcommon
law. State v. Jackson, 418.
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21. Ali unsuccessful attempt to bribe the elector will subject the offender to
indictment. State v. Jackson, 418.
IV. Counterfeiting. ,
22. An indictment on sect. 5431, U. S. Rev. Stat., alleging that defendant,
feloniously and with intent to deftraud, did pass, utter and publish a falsely
made, forged, counterfbited and altered obligation of the United States, but
not further alleging that the defbndant knew it to be false, forged, counter-
feited and altefed, is insufficient even after verdict. United States v. Carli,
680.
V. Larceny.
23. It is larceny to obtain by threats payment of an excessive charge for
work. Regina v. Lovell, 705, and note.
24. A pledgee, obtaining possession of the thing pledged from the pledgor,
by deception and false pretence, with the felonious design to deprive the latter
of his security, is guilty of larceny. Bruley v. Rose, 814.
25. When things attached to the realty are detached therefrom they become
the subject-matter of larceny even by the person detaching them. Beal v.
State, 268.
26. Difference between larceny and trespass. Id.
27. Evidence of general belief among colored people that property found
belongs to the finder, no defence to prosecution under statute making the con-
version of such property larceny. State v. Welch, 71.
28. The possession of property recently stolen is prima facie evidence of guilt,
unless the surrounding circumstances create a reasonable doubt. Smith v. The
People, 739, and note.
29. The recent possession of stolen property authorizes a conviction, unless
the presumption of guilt arising therefrom is overcome by other facts. State v.
Kelly, 809.
30. But defendant is only required to introduce evidence which creates a
reasonable doubt. State v. .Richart, 809.
VI. M urder.
31. Under a statute providing that wilful, deliberate, malicious and premed-
itated killing shall be murder in the first degree, evidence that the accused was
intoxicated at the time of the killing is competent upon the question whether he
was capable of deliberate premeditation. Hoft v. People, 482.
VII. Trespass.
32. It is not a misdemeanor for one to break a partition fence between his
lot and another's. Nor is it a trespass to knock off the plank added to it by
the other ; but destruction of such fence would be a trespass. Drees v. The
State, 344.
CUSTOM. See Comno- LAw, 1.
1. A general custom that a broker may pledge his customers' stock is valid,
and so also is a custom to sell without notice upon a fall of the stock in value
below a price which would reimburse the broker. Vanhorn v. Gilbough, 171.
2. Effect of stock exchange customs upon non-members. Id., note.
3. Evidence of, inadmissible when contrary to express provision of contract.
Haclkley v. Headley, 109.
DAMAGES. See ADMIRALTY, 5, 13; EQUITY, 6 ; ERRORS AND ArrEALs, 19;
HUSBAND AND WerE, 26; MLALICIOUS POSECUTIoz, 5, 11, 17, 18;
PATENT, 21; SLANDER; TELEGRAPH, 7; TnOVER, 4; WATERS AND WATER-
COURSES, 2.
1. The measure of damages for breach of contract to convey land if without
the fault of the vendor, is the consideration paid with interest, but if the breach
occurs through his fault, the value of the land, if greater than the consideration,
may be recovered. Yokom v. M1cBride, 546.
2. Where the damages for breach of contract must necessarily be. incapable
of estimation, as e. g.. damages for breach of a contract not to engage in a
cgriun business for a limited time, a sum agreed upon by the parties is liqui-
dated damages and not a penalty. Alewman v. Wolfson, 809.
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3. In an action on a warranty of seed, prospective profits on the land planted
are not recoverable. Butler v. JIoore, 483.
4. Beyond the payment of interest a city is not liable to a creditor for his
pecuniary embanassment caused by its failure to meet it! obligations. London
v. Tahoing Dist. If SdiIby Conity, 680.
5. A railroad employee, injured by the negligence of the company, may
recover general damages on account of pain, physical injury and depreciation of
power to labor, without proof of the value of his labor. Geogia Southern
Railroad Co. v. Neal, 483.
6. In an action for the wrongful ejection of a passenger from the cars of a
railroad, damages are recoverable for injuries caused by the act of plaintiff
in walking to the next station, if such walking was rendered necessary by the
ejection and was not negligent. Brown v. C. J1. and St. Patul Railroad Co.,
418.
7. In an action for personal injuries whereby plaintiff was prevented friom
conducting his business, evidence of the profits of such business is inadmissible.
Bicrbach, v. Gwedgco RIYU r Co., 419.
8. In an action for an injury to an animal resulting in death, evidence is
inadmissible as to the value of the use of the animal between the time of injury
and the time of death, and of the value of plaintiff's services in taking care of
it, and where a verdict necessarily includes such items it is excessive. Page v.
Towa of S.nptee, 201.
DEBTOR AND CREDITOR. See COnPOR O.AxoN, 6. HUSBAND AND WIFE,
27. INSOLVi;NCY. LiMITATIOxN, STATUTE OF, S. P'AarTNE sHIP, 14.
PATENT, 1, 2. UNITED STATES Couns, 4, 6.
I. The retention of personal property by a vendor after sale is, as against
his creditors, presumptive but not conclusive evidence of fraud. Mead v.
Gardhvr, 138.
2. Where a farmer sells a horse to an employee who continues to keep it on
the farm, paying a certain sum for its keep, but taking care of it himself, there
is no such change of possession as would render the sale valid as to creditors.
Hill v. Sigso.orth, 268.
3. By a contract between A. and B., all the colts thereafter foaled by certain
mares sold by B. to A., and kept in B.'s stables under A.'s care, wvere to belong
to A. Held, 1. That a valid sale could be made of the colts before they were
foaled. 2. That the question of retention of posession by B. could not apply to
them, as they were not in existence when the mares were sold to A. and the
contract made. 3. That it was not important, upon a question between A.
and the creditors of B. as to the title to the colts, whether there had been a legal
and visible change of possession as to the mares. Hull v. Hi'll, 201.
4. A sale on condition that the title shall not pass until payment, is valid as
against creditors, and is not invalidated by the fact that the property will k
consumed in the use, nor by a power of sale given to the vendee. Lwis v.
1McC'abe, 217.
5. Distinction between bailments and conditional sales. Id., note.
6. A voluntary conveyance may be set aside by subsequent creditors upon
proof of an intention to defraud them, but the burden of proof is upon them to
show such intent. Igru,, v. Heathcr, 483.
7. Transfer of land by a debtor in consideration of money advanced to him
to pay his creditors, and upon the tith of a composition and receipt by such
creditors is valid as against them, though they are never paid. Kiuhn v. Well,
71.
S. A subsequent creditor seeking to impeach a conveyance, must show actual
fraud or that there are debts still unpaid. Teaeg v. MeGehee, 750.
9. Fraud is not presumed, and circumstances of mere suspicion leading to no
certain results are not sufficient proof. ld.
10. A mortgage made to a creditor to defraud other creditors, and kept off
of the record in order to give the mort.agor a fictitious credit, is void at com-
mon law. Bleaerhoqset v. Sherana, 750.
11. Such mortgage is void under the bankrupt law, although executed
more than two months before the filing of the petition. Id.
VOL. XX.-105
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12. It is constructively fraudulent for one partner in a firm largely indebted,
to make a voluntary conveyance of his individual property. Barhydt v. Perry,
755.
13. Subsequett creditors whose means have been used to pay existing debts,
may avoid such conveyance. Id.
14. To render a conveyance fraudulent it is not necessary to trace fraudulent
knowledge to the grantee. W'7eir v. Day, 750.
15. Conveyance made to avoid claim for tort may be set aside as fraudulent.
Id.
16. Creditor not bound bya composition with the debcor obtained by fraudu
lent concealment by the latter of his property, and false representation as to his
means. Ac/erman v. Adlerman, 681.
17. Acceptance by trustee of assignment for benefit of creditors if made before
the filing of a bill attacking the assignment, enures to the benefit of creditors
'accepting subsequent to the bill. Aailer v. Youq, 71.
18. The same effect might, perhaps, result from the legal presumption of the
acceptance by beneficiaries of an assignment in their favor. Id.
19. An assignment for the benefit of creditors which authorizes the assignee
to sell at public or private sale, buy in the premises, resell without responsi-
bility for loss and also to mortgage, and from the proceeds to pay first the
creditors secured by mortgage and then the other creditors, is valid. Waldron
v. Wilcox, 546.
20. Certificates of membership in a board of trade are property, and may
be subjected to the payment of debts by a creditor's bill. Smith v. Barclay,
408, and note.
21. Where one orders a chattel to be made, though he pays the whole price
in advance, he acquires no title until it is finished and delivered, unless a con-
trary intent is expressed, and even when such intent is expressed, the chattel is
open to attachment by the creditors of the vendor. Shaow v. Smith, 201.
22. A creditor having no lien by attachment, levy or otherwise on his
debtor's property, cannot maintain an action on the case against third per-
sons for conspiring to defeat his claim by receiving from the debtor fictitious
mortgages of his personal property. .llous v. Hennessey, 137.
DECEDENTS' ESTATES. See ADVANCEMENT. ExEcUTORS. HUSBAND AND
WirE, 22, 23. LIFE TENANT.
An heir who, believing the estate solvent, receives from the executrix land
devised to him and makes valuable improvements thereon, is liable on the sub-
sequent insolvency of the estate only for the value of the land without the
improvements. Gillespie v. Murphy, 750.
DECEIT. See Fnxiun, 1-3.
DECREE. See HUSBAND AND WIFE, 4. MORTGAGE, 8, 9. PRACTICE, 3.
DEED. See AcKITOWLEDGMENT. LUNATIC, 4, 5.
1. Delivery to a stranger for delivery to the grantee will pass the title, but
recording without the knowledge of the grantee will not. Byars v. Spencer,
268.
2. Where a father executes and acknowledges a deed to two minor children,
but retains it in his own possession and declines to have it recorded, there is no
sufficient delivery. Id.
3. Delivery of deed to husband of grantee with intent to pass the title vests
the property in the grantee although made without her kuowledge. Parker v.
Parker, 419.
4. Monuments established by a surveyor at the time of survey will always
prevail over written descriptions. People v. Stahl, 268.
5. Any description for purposes of taxation by which the land may be
identified by a competent surveyor with reasonable certainty, either with or
without extrinsic evidence, is sufficient. Id.
6. A grantee who has accepted a deed poll cannot, in the absence of fraud,
show by parol evidence that a certain agreement therein was inserted without
his knowledge or authority. MAuhlig v. Fiske, 269.
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7. A conveyance made in consideration of the support of parents will be set
aside upon proof of abandonment of the contract of support, Jewell v. Red-
diqtoa, 750.
8. A conveyance in trust to have and to hold the same as tenants in common
so long as they both shall live, and from and after the death of either of them,
then unto the survivor so long as she shall live and no longer, or so long as
they both shall remain unmarried ; ant from and after the marriage of either of
them, then unto the one remaining unmarried, so long as she shall live and no
longer is not against the policy of the law and is valid. Arthur v. Cole, 344.
9. Of two inconsistent descriptions, the grantee may elect the one most
favorable to him. Sharwp v. Toapson, 71.
10. Extrinsic evidence of the state of the property at the time of the execution
of the deed is admissible to aid in the construction of a doubtful description.
Thifac(ly v. Ro5in on, 137.
11. The entry of the grantee, and the making of fences and improvements
by him, with the acquiescence of the grantor, constitutes a practical construction
of the deed binding on the parties. Id.
DELIVERY. See DEED, 3. -
DEMURRER. See EQUiTY, 18.
DESCENT.
1. Children of the same mother, whether legitimate or illegitimate, may
transmit an inheritance to collateral relatives on the mother's side. Gregley v.
Jacks. on, 750.
2. Laws of inheritance may be changed at will during the life of a person
without violating any vested right in his expectant heirs. Id.
DEVISE. See WILL.
DISCOVERY. See UNITED STATES Couris, 4.
DIVIDENDS. See LirE TENANT.
DIVORCE. See HUSBAND AND WIFE, I.
DOMICILE.
One leaving Boston for an indefinite stay in Europe, with the design of
rcturnin, to a new domicile in the United States, and who while in Europe fixes
upon such new domicile, nevertheless retains his domicile in Boston for the
purposes of taxation during his stay in Europe. Borland v. City of Boston, 809.
DONATIO CAUSA MORTIS. See Girr, 5, 6.
DURESS.
1. Taking advantage of a party's financial embarrassment to obtain a set-
tlement for a less sum than is due is not a duress of goods. HEackley v. Head-
Icy, 109.
2. What constitutes dures. Id., note.
3. A father may avoil a mortgage which he has been induced to sign by
threats of thei procution and imprisonment of his son. Harris v. Carinody,
269.
4. A married woman's deed, duly acknowledged, will not be set aside for
duress, except on the clearest evidence. Linnoheioper v. Kernpton, 751.
EASEMENT.
1. Will not arise by prescription where the use has been habitually inter
rapted at the pleasure of the owner of the servient tenement. Kirschner v.
Wtst. and At. Rilroad Co., 269.
2. The same rules of law apply to subterranean rights of way as to those
upon the surface. Poinroy v. Bir.'y-qe Salt Co., 260.
3. The owner of coal lands, through which another has a subterranean right
of way, may construct an entry crossing such way if lie does not interfere with
its uie. Id4.
4. The appropriation of part of a way by the owner of one of the dominant
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tenements is an abandonment of his easement in the whole way. Steerev.
T iffany, 809.
EJECTMENT.
Where two contestants voluntarily divide the profits of land between them
one cannot, in a subsequent action of ejectment against the other, recover such
profits. White v. Rowland, 270.
ELECTION. See DEED, 9.
Mere irregularities, not fraudulent and not affecting the result, will not jvs-
tify the rejection of the entire poll. Hedge v. Linn, 71.
EMNENT DOMAIN. See CONSTITUTIONAL LA v, II.
ENCUMBRANCE. See MORTGAGE.
EQUITY. See ACTION, 2, 3; CORPORATION, 13, 14; INJUNCTION; INSUR-
ANCE, 1 ; Lis PNDaNS, 1; MORTGAGE, 8, 9, 14-17; PATENT, 1, 2, 11;
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE ; TAXATION, 14.
1. Will not decree a judgment lien to be invalid on the ground of Avant of legal
notice, where there has been actual knowledge of the action, unless a meritori-
ous defence be shown. Gjfford v. Morrisoe, 270.
2. Has no jurisdiction to entertain a bill to compel the corporate authorities
of a town to issue and deliver its bonds in pursuance of a vote to aid in the
construction of a railroad. Chicago and V. Railroad Co. v. Town of St. Anne,
202.
3. Where no discovery is sought a bill cannot be maintained by the owners
against the master of a vessel sailing her on shares, merely to obtain an account.
Bird v. Hall, 419.
4. Affirmative relief cannot be granted to respondent upon his answer without
a cross bill. Wldte v. White, 681.
5. Where in a case cognizable at law the ground on which a court of equity
has taken jurisdiction fails, the court will dismiss the bill. Mitchell v. Dowell,
751.
6. A court which has issued an injunction has, on the final disposition of the
cause, power to make a decree granting or denying damages on account thereof.
Russell v. Farley, 651.
7. Such power may be exercised by a federal court to which the case has
been removed, although the state courts would not have possessed it. Id.
8. Semnble. The court may also assess the amount of the damages. Id.
9. The decision of the court on the question of damages will not be reversed,
except in a very clear case of error. .d.
10. Cross bill will not lie where there is no connection between the demands
or the parties. Comfort v. JicTeer, 72.
11. Where a debtor absconds leaving no legal assets, his creditors may at
once proceed in equity against his equitable assets, and if their claims are
specially fit for legal cognizance, the court may submit them to a jury on issue.
Merchants' Nat. Bank v. Paine, 810.
12. Has jurisdiction in case of abuse of children to take them out of their
parent's custody and appoint a guardian, and such jurisdiction is not taken
away by a like power conferred on the probate courts. State v. Grigsky, 803.
13. The better practice is to bring such bill in the name of the infant by his
next friend, but the bill will not be dismissed because brought in the name of
the state. Id.
14. Where the facts which render an assessment upon land invalid, are not
matter of record, an action to prevent a cloud upon the title, by setting aside
the assessment, may be maintained either by the present owner or by one who
has conveyed it by warranty deed. Pir v. Fond du Lac County, 202.
15. In such an action the grantee, though a proper, is not a necessary
party. Id
16. The rule that a bill to remove a cloud upon a title lies only where the
complainant is in possession or the land is vacant, does not apply where a deed
is sought to be set aside for fraud. Booth v. Wiley, 483.
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17. As to bills of review relating to errors on the face of the decree, the rule
requiring previous performance of the decree does not apply. Daris v.
,Spdde , 72.
18. Presumption of payment of mortgage from lapse of time may be raised
by demurrer. Any circumstances which repel such presumption must be avered
in the bill. OldMa v. Hidbbard, 72.
19. Pleas alleging conclusions of law, or which are not in accordance with
the rules, may be disregarded. Cltrol 1\74t. Bank v. Com. Met. Ljfl Ins.
Co., 72.
20. The want of a replication cannot be assigned for error upon appeal after
hearing on the merits. Id.
ERRORS A-,D APPEALS. See AD..IIRALTY, 3, 4. BILLS OF REVIEW.
EtUITY, 9, 20. HUSBAND AND WIFE, 9. JUDG:MENT, 6, 8. Juny, 2.
PATLNT, 19. TRuST, 2.
I. Upon a joint bill filed by the owners of separate properties to restrain the
collection of as'essments against them, the jurisdiction of the appellate court
depends upon the amount of the largest individual assessment and not upon
the aggregate amount of such assessments. Russell v. ,Stansdl, 483.
2. In a contest between the creditors of an estate, the jurisdiction of the
appellate court is determined by the aggregate amount of the claims of credit-
ors interested in the result of the litigation, and not by the amount of claims
provable against the estate. (hhofid v. Bafole, 419.
3. A judgment of reversal is effective notwithstanding the death of the plain-
tiff in error during the pendeney of the proceedings in error. lVi[iaas v.
Evphbirecld, 419.
4. Record cannot be returned in admiralty case to supply omission of finding
of fact unless such omission was the fault of the court. IVinsioz, v. tvilcox,
72.
5. It is not a valid objection to an appeal from a District Court of the United
States to a Circuit Court that the former court allowed it without writing, in
violation of a rule of that court. lVinsov v. Wlilcox, 810.
6. Nor will a rule that the appeal and record should be delivered to the Cir-
cuit Couurt in twenty days, prevent the latter court from entertaining the
appeal, although the rule is not complied with. Id.
7. A cross-appeal must be prosecuted us if no other appeal was pending.
I.
8. On appeal from a District to a Circuit Court of the United States, the
district judge cannot vote, and therefore the case cannot be brought to the
Supreme Court on a certificate of division of opinion. Uaitd States v. Ela-
holt, 810.
9. An information for a forfeiture under the internal reVenue laws cannot be
brought from the Circuit to the Supreme Court. Id.
10. Under sect. 693 Rev. Stat., final judgments of Circuit Courts in civil
actions where there has heen a division of opinion of tie judgc are only
reviewable on writ of error or appeal. The Act of 1802 was suspended by the
Act of July 1st 1872. Banking H,,lse v. Tratsees, 72.
11. An appeal lies from a decree in equity tor costs where they are directed
to be paid out of a fund in the control of the court. Tls,st es of ,,t. I,p. lnad
v. Gr,"laoqb', 681.
12. WVhere a municipal ordinance prohibits that. which is a crime o," misde-
meanor at common Iaw, and prescribes a penalty by fine with imprikonment on
dethult of payment, an action to recover such penalty is qwrsi criminal, and no
appeal lie'. P ''yedbuf, ,c., o  Plattsc'illc v. McKi&raan, 618.
13. Where the evidence tenid to make out the plaintitfs case, its effect is for
the jury, and the appellate court will not review or weigh it. Caddy V. flora,
302.
14. An appeal from a final decree brings before the appellate court all inter-
locutory order., involving tle merits. ('oir v. Tflonle, 618.
15. On ap'peal from the final decree, the appellate court will decide wheter
a decree of retireaee. recribing the hmnit- oI the accounting, e right. But
items clearly within the limits of the referejice, not allowed by the master,
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where exceptions to the report have not been filed, will not be considered. Cla
v. Terlune, 618.
16. The limitation of two years prescribed by sect. 1008 Rev. Stat., applies
to writs of error to state courts. Cunaings v. Jones, 345.
17. A reversal will not be granted because the verdict was only one-half
what it should have been if any recovery at all was had. Alderman v. Cox,
345.
18. An error in admitting the evidence of an incompetent witness in a chan-
cery case is no ground of reversal when the record contains other evidence
which is competent and sufficient. Bitter v. Schenc, 270.
19. On error to reverse a judgment in damages for breach of contract where
the damages are excessive, the court may, in certain cases, affirm the judgment
upon a remittitur of tile excess being filed. C. 6 -0. Railroad Co. v. limhrd
Furnace Co., 270.
20. The erroneous sustaining of a demurrer to a replication to one of several
defences in the answer, requires the reversal of a final judgment for the defend-
ant which is not clearly shown by the record to have proceeded upon other
grounds. Moores v. Citizens' Aat. Bank, 345.
ESTOPPEL. See ACKNOWLEDGM1ENT, 3. AGENT, 1. BILLS AND NOTES, 5.
INSUKANCE, 8. MiSTER AND SERVANT, 4. MORTGAGE, 13, 18. PLEDGE,
1. RECEIVER, 7. SnERIFF'S SALE, 4.
1. An admission of indebtedness by the garnishee to the attaching creditor
prior to the attachment does not estop him from afterwards denying such indebt-
edness although it is evidence against him. Warder v. Baker, 419.
2. The customer of a stock broker admitting that he never intended to pay
for stock bought is estopped from complaining of want of notice of the sale of
the stock. Tan Horn v. Gilbough, 171.
EVIDENCE. See ACKNOWLEDGMENT, 4. ADVANCEMENT. AssuPSIT. BILLS
AND NOTES, 8, 17. CONTRACT, 3. 7. COPYRIGHT. CRI3IINAL LA-W, 1, 3,
6, 11-13, 27, 28, 30, 31. CUSTo.%, 3. DAMAGES. 7. DEED, 6, 10. Es-
TOPPEL, I. EXECUTioN, 2. Ji-USAND AND WIrE, 20. LIMITATIONS,
STATUTE OF, 6. MALICIOUS PROSECUTION, 13. MORTGAGE, 3. MvuxIti-
PAL CORPoRATION, 9. NAM31E. PARENT AND CEtILD, 3. PARTNERSIIIP, 7,
25. PAYMENT, I. SALE, 1. TELEGRAPIt, 1-3. UNITED STATES COVRTS,
1. WILL, 9, 14. WITNESS.
1. When a contract is executed in duplicate, both copies are originals, and
one may be offered without notice to produce the other. Yottm v. Bavr, 484.
2. A merchant's account-book was offered in evidence ; it appeared that the
memorandum of sales was made as they took place, on a little pass-book or
blotter ; that at the close of each day, or at most with a delay of but a day or
two, these memoranda were copied into the journal or account-book offered in
evidence ; it also appeared that these pass-books or blotters had been lost or
destroyed, and tile party who made the copies in the accoant-book testified that
they were correct. Held, no error in admitting such book of account. Rice v.
Simpson, 137.
3. Where a written contract is susceptible of two constructions, one fair and
reasonable, and the other so highly favorable to the party preparing the writing
that it was not likely to be knowingly accepted by the other party, parol tes-
tinony is admissible of the prior negotiations and the situation and admissions
of the parties. Mason v. Ryas. 136.
4. A written contract purporting to contain the whole contract cannot be
varied or amplified by parol evidence. Hell v. Heller, 202.
5. A return to a writ of replevin that the goods were found in the town of
H. is not evidence that they were found there. Parker v. Palmer, 202.
6. A note of the ancestor is not admissible in a suit revived against the heirs
without proof of its execution. Davis v. Smith, 159.
7. In suit for damages for personal injury, evidence of an attempt by de-
fendant to corruptly influence one of plaintiff's witnesses is admissible. Cd-
cage City Railway Co. v. VcMahon, 681.
S. Parol evidence admissible to show that because of the fraud of a party to
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an instrument it doet not express the real agreement. Hopkins v. Haukeye
Ins,. Co., 748.
9. Contract created by endorsement of note cannot be varied by parol proof.
Martia v. Cole, 73.
10. The law of a sister state is a question of fact to be proved by evidence.
In the absencc of such evidence it will be presumed that the comion law is in
force. Mg yr v.MeCabe, 70.
11. Parol evidence admissible to show that mortgage has been discharged
or to explain or contradict the consideration clause. Baile v. St. Joseph . '5"
M. fis. Co, 37.
12. An original ft. fa. may be taken out of court and used in evidence.
Thomas v. Porke,,, 8 11.
13. A fi.fa. from a federal court will be recognised by the state courts
without other than intrinsic proof. Id.
14. Whether a witness is qualified to testify as an expert is a preliminary
question for the judge, whose decision is conclusive, unless it appears upon the
evidence to have been erroneous. Pcrkias v. Stickney, 816.
15. A treasurer of a mill corporation, whose only knowledge of the quality of
the coal burned in his mill is derived from the weekly reports of his engineer,
is not qualified as an expert to testify as to such quality, although he has
bought all the coal used in the mill for several years. Id.
16. The court will take judicial notice of the county in which an incor-
porated town is situated, and of the fact whether such county is under township
organization. Peole v. S,'ppiger, 681.
17. The printed journals of the legislature, published by legal authority, are
competent evidence of legislative proceedings. Amoskeag V . Bank v.
Ottomca, 681.
18. Portions of medical books cannot be read as evidence, although such
books be shown by expert testimony to be standard works. Siting v. Torn
of Tlioep, 619.
19. Non-experts must state grounds and facts sufficient to justify the expres-
sion of an opinion. Kcrby v. Kerdy, 484.
20. Persons in the service of one alleged to be infirm in mind, and con-
stantly about such person, and having business dealings with him, are compe-
tent to express an opinion respecting his mental condition. Id.
21. EXPERT TESTIaONY-SIENTIrIO TESTIMONY IN TIMt EXAMIINATION
or Wnmriex DocusENis, ILLUSTRATED By TiE; WHITTAKER CASE, &c.,
425, 489.
EXECUTION. See EVIDENCE, 12. INJUNOTION, 3, 4. PAET'Xr.sHIP, 2, 4.
SHrEmRt'S SALr.
1. Property levied upon by a constable under a valid execution is not sub-
ject to levy by any other officer. Joes, S. 4 '. Co. v. Case, 138.
2. A levv on real estate undisposed of is not prima facie evidence of satis-
faction. dcerby v. Hart, 345.
3. That aft.Jflu, has been levied on land, a claim interposed and dismissed
and thet.fifa. ordered to proceed, will not prevent a levy on other realty or
require the ft.fa. to proceed on the orizinal levy. Id.
4. To make a valid levy the officer must do such acts as that hut for the pro-
tection of the writ he would be liable in trespass. Rix v. Silkiditer, 751.
5. The sheriff sells only the title of defendant and the real owner may main-
tain replevin or trover against the sheritPs vendee. Ridicnbach v. MeKean, 619.
6. A pledge may be sold on execution against the pawnor, but the sheriffs
vendee takes subject to the lien of the pawnee. Id.
7. Exemptions must be strictly eonstrued. Pitard v. Carey, 546.
8. One who does work on a public building under a contract is not an
officer within a statutory exemption of the salary of an officer. Id.
EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS. See ATTr.cenirx. 2. CoupsE.
GIFT, 1. JUDICIAL SALE, 1. NOTicE, 2. SURETY, 6-8. WILL, 7, 22.
1. Where an administrator uses the funds of the estate, rendering no account
thereof, he is chargeable with compound interest, and the failure to account raises
a presumption of such use. Camp's Crelitors v. Camp's Admidwtrators, 484.
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2. An administrator may rightfully become the purchaser of the land of his
intestate at a tax sale. Stark v. Frown, 270.
3. An executor who collects a large amount of money without his co-execu-
tor's knowledge, and gives a mortgage of his own lands to secure it, is not, by
iving such mortgage, exonerated from liability to his co-executor. Stew-s v.
Quackenbush, 138.
4. An administrator who signs a note describing himself as administrator,
becomes, in the absence of an express stipulation to the contrary, personally
liable. Studebaker Bros. M31an. Co. v. Mlontgomery, 345.
5. Where a legacy is to be invested and not paid until the majority of the
legatee, it is the duty of the executor to compound the interest by investing it
as received. Perrine v. Petty, 138.
6. An executor who lends such fund to his co-executor on inadequate security,
is liable for compound interest, and the fact that such investment is stated in
his account in the Orphans' Court will not relieve him. Id.
7. Where an administrator deposits funds of the estate in his own name in
bank, he is liable for a loss by the bank's failure, even though at the time of
the deposit he informed the officers that the moneys were held in trust. Wil-
liams v. Williams, 619.
8. A power of sale does not authorize an executrix to mortgage the estate.
Gillespie v. Muaphy, 752.
9. An executrix cannot borrow money and charge the estate, and if she
renews notes of the testator she makes them her personal obligations. Id.
10. But she may prove as creditor for sums borrowed and used for the estate,
and the lenders may by cross bill be subrogated to her rights. Id.
11. Where on an administrator's account credit for a payment is disallowed,
lie is liable for interest on such sums from the date of payment. Mount v.
Van A ees, 811.
12. That an executor fails to record a mortgage that had been given by him
to the testator, and also claims credits which appear to be false, are sufficient
grounds for requiring him to give security. Bird v. Higgins, 811.
13. Upon an application to assess the damages on a judgment recovered
against an administrator and his sureties, because of his failure to apply to the
payment of the intestate's debts the proceeds of lands sold under an order of
the Orphans' Court, Held, That as the administrator had authority to sell
only the lands specified in the order of the Orphans' Court, his sureties are not
liable for the proceeds of sale of any other lands, and that there can be no
deduction in the administrator's favor because of his failure to exhaust the per-
sonal estate of the intestate in payment of his debts before applying the'proceeds
of the realty thereto. In re Givens's Adm'r, 1.38.
EXEIPTION. See EXECUTIoN, 7, 8. TAxATION, 18.
EXPERT. See EVIDFNCE, 14, 15, 21.
EXPRESS COMPANY.
A foreign railroad company doing an express business is liable to a privilege
tax imposed by a state upon express companies. Memphis and Little Reck
Railroad Co. v. State, 752.
FENCE. See CRIMINAL Law, 32.
FLXTURE. See CRIn1NAL LAW, 25.
1. When actually or constructively annexed after the execution of a mort-
gage, fixtures cannot be removed without the consent of the mortgagee. IVigld
v. Gray, 484.
2. As between vendor and vendee the rule for determining what is a fixture,
is construed strongly against the vendor. Pratt v. ittier, 49.
3. Character of chattels attached to the freehold depends upon the agreement
of the parties. Id.
4. Gas fixtures, raige, tank, filter, window screens, &e., held upon the
construction of a contract of sale to pass to the vendee as part of the realty. Id.
5. Character of gas fixtures, stoves and furnaces, &c. Id., note.
FOREIGN ATTACHMENT. See ATTAOCEENT, 6.
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FOREIGN TUDGMENT. See ATTACHMENT, 10. HUSBAND AND WrF, 3.
FORFEITURE. See INsURA&NCE, 1-6. 'MASTER AND SIVANT, 2.
FORMER ADJUDICATION. See TAx, 4.
1. A suit brought after the maturity of a note to recover an instalment of
interest and a recovery therein, is no bar to a subsequent action to recover the
principal. DuanCy v. Payne, 270.
2. One not a party to an action, not notified of its tendency, having no oppor-
tunity to control the defence or take a writ of error, is not bound by the judg-
ment. Hate v. Fineh, 202.
3. The fact that a note stipulates that the principal shall become due on
default in any payment of interest, will not in case of such default merge tile
interest with the principal, and a rceovery in a suit for the interest 1sill not
bar a suit for interest subsequently accrued. U'ehrly v. Morot, 682.
FRAUD. See ATTACHTEN T, 12. COPROrLTION, 15, 17. DEBTOR AND CPED-
ITon, 1-16, 22. LUNATIO, 5. PARTNERSHIr, 14. SALE, 12.
1. An action may be maintained by the buyer of a patent right again-t the
seller fr a false representation as to novelty, although by searching the records
of the Patent Office the buyer might have discovered the fraul. McKee v.
Eato, 139.
2. Where the value of property depends upon future contingencies or
developments, no action will lie for an expression of opinion as to it, however
fallacious. Gordon v. Betlr, 752.
3. Sesble. For a false expre -ion of opinion as To matters capable of
accurate estimation, or by a person having special learning upon the subject,
an action will lie. Id.
FRAUDS, STATUTE OF. See SPEcxrc PEnRou sixcr, 6. TELEGRAPH, 4.
1. An agreement by the owner of a vessel to pay a lien thereon, for a debt
incurred by a former owner, is not a promise to pay the debt of another withi i
the statute. Pears v. Story, 271.
2. A guaranty by a debtor of the note of a third person given to his crelitor,
in payment of his debt, is not within the Statute of Frauds. Eagle 1f. aod R.
Mach. Co. v. Sat,,d:, 202.
3. If, upon the cluse of a partnership, one partner takes to his own use a
portion of the assets whether choses in action or anything else, on an oral agree-
ment to account to his co-partners for a definite share, the agreement is no t
within the statute. Con r v. Colton, 423.
4. Where one agrees to satisfy his obligation to an estate, 1wv distributing the
sum he holds among its creditors, such agreement is not a promise to pay the
debt of another within the statute. Do-vir v. Fec-rio, 139.
5. A verbal promise in the alternative to compensate a party by will, either
in land or money, is within the statute. Howard v. Brewer, 139.
6. Where the agreement sued on is within the statute, and it is fairly to be
inferred from the petition that it is not in writing, the defence of the statute
is available on demurrer. Id.
7. When a conveyance in trust is made voluntarily, and the only fraud
alleged is in repudiating the agreement, it will not remove the case from tl.e
operation of the statute. ]IfcClabi v. MeClahi, 811.
S. Where the terms of an agreement are evidenced by a writing sufficient to
satisfy the statute, it will be binding notwithstanding the fact that the writing
was intended only as instructions for a formal agreement to be prepared and
signed. Wllarton v. tonte wngh, 619.
9. August 20th an oral contract was made between A. and B., by which A.
was to enter B.'s service for one year, A. to begin the term of service as soon
as he could. A. began work August 27th. Held, that the contract was
within the Statute of Frauds, being an oral contract not to be performed
within a year. Sutclffe v. Atlantic Mills, 546.
GARNISHMENT. See ATTACHMENT.
GIFT. See GUARDIAN AND WARD, 6.
1. Where stock stood in a testator's name on the books of the corporation,
the facts that the certificate is found in the executor's possession and that the
VOL. XKX.-106
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testator gave him a power of attorney to receive and assign any dividend, are
not conclusive evidence of a gift of the stock to the executor. Smith v. Bur-
net, 139.
2. The making of a deposit in a savings bank in the name of another with-
out surrendering the book or the control of the fund, does not make the de-
positor a trustee for the person in whose name the deposit was made. .Northrop
v. Hale, 420.
3. A gift from a lady to her medical adviser is voidable only and may be
ratified by the intentional adherence of the donor to it after the termination of
the relation. Mitchell v. Hmnfray, 871.
4. Gifts by persons in confidential relations. Id., note.
5. Property delivered to an agent with directions to deliver it to another in
case of death, but to return it in case of recovery, is not a valid donatio casa
mortis. W lter v. Ford, 684.
6. Whether a bank check can be the subject of a donatio causa mortis, quere •
Id.
GUARANTY. See BILLS AND NOTES, 11, 21. CONTiRACT, 11. CORPOIATION,
17. FRAUDS, STATUTE or, 2.
1. Notice of acceptance of guaranty is not necessary where it is made at the
request of the creditor or for a valuable consideration, or is in form a bilateral
contract. Davis v. Wells, 73.
2. Where a guaranty declares that the guarantor guarantees unconditionally
at all times any advances, &c., to a third person, notice of demand of payment
and the default of the debtor is waived, as- well as notice of the amount of the
advances. Id.
3. But a failure to give such notice, if required, would be a defence only to
the amount of the damage actually caused. Id.
4. Contracts of guaranty are to be liberally construed. Id.
GUARDIAN AND WARD. See EQUITY, 12. MuNIcIPAL BONDS, 4.
1. Where a guardian, who was also the father of the ward, never made any
charge for maintenance, his sureties are not entitled to allowance therefor in a
suit on the bond. In re Walling, 812.
2. The ward's omission to sue the surety for nine years after coming of age
will not prevent his recovery. Id.
3. The approval of the probate court is not essential to the validity of a
lease by a guardian. Field v. MerridJ:, 203.
4. A full settlement between guardian and ward, after the latter becomes of
age, acquiesced in for more than four years, is prima facie binding. Steadhain v.
Sims, 346.
5. While the guardian should inform the ward of the condition of the estate,
it is not necessary in all cases that h6 should make a detailed statement of the
receipts, expenditures, debts, &c. Id.
6. The gift from a ward to the guardian is voidable, and the burden of proof
is on the latter to show that it was freely and voluntarily made, and that the
donor had competent and disinterested advice. Wade v. Palsifer, 682.
7. The settlement of the guardian's account; the presence of the wards;
their receipts ; their expression of approval ; their declarations that they did
not regret the -ifts ; lapse of time; the death of the donee, and one of the
donors, do not affect the result. Id.
HABEAS CORPUS.
1. An allegation that children are concealed by respondents in one or the
other of two counties, is sufficient to give the courts of one of the counties
jurisdiction, and it is no excuse to return that the children are in the other
county, unless it is also alleged that they are beyond respondent's power.
Rivers v. Mitchell, 812.
2. A prisoner under sentence of a court martial cannot be discharged under
habeas corpus if the court martial had jurisdiction, and the sentence was one
which it had power to pronounc. Ex parte Mason, 812.
HIGHWAY. See CONSTITUTIONAL LA , 23, 24. MUNICIPAL CoRro uTIoN, 7.
NUISANCE. SHERIFF, 5.
INDEX. 843
HOMSTEAD.
Lien on a crop by a factor furnishing supplies is superior to the homestead
right of the debtor's wife. Cool: v. Roberts, 812.
HUSBAIND AND WIFE. See AcsNsOWLEnGasNT, 4. , ATTOmREY, 3. Cnmxx-
NAL LAW, 7, 8, 13. LIITATIONS, STATUTE OF, 10.
I. 3Iariage, Dicorce and Alimony.
1. A statute prohibiting the guilty part from marrying after divorce has
no extra-territorial effect, and the marriage of such party in another state is
valid though made there to evade the prohibitory law. Van Voords v. Brint-
nall, 9, and note.
2. So much of a decree in divorce against a person not residing within the
jurisdiction of the court as provides that such person shall not marry again
is invalid. Garer v. Gaaer, 346.
3. The courts of a state in which a marriage valid by its laws is contracted
between subjects of foreign states will give effect to a subsequent decree of the
court of the foreign state of which the husband was a subject, annulling the
marriage on the ground that it had been contracted without the consent of the
sovereign of such foreign state, it appearing that at the time of the decree of
nullity both parties had returned to such foreign state and were within the
jurisdiction of the court pronouncing the decree. Roth v. Elanan, 589,
and note.
4. A decree of divorce may be re-opened during the term at which it was
entered, but will not be re-opened at the request of a respondent who has been
guilty of delay or false pleading. Jmford v. lum ford, 203.
5. Divorced wife can maintain action against former husband for services
performed before their marriage. Carlton v. Carlton, 74.
6. A decree vesting in the wife specific personal property of the husband as
alimony is valid, at least when made in pursuance of an agreement of the
parties. Crors v. Mooney, 346.
7. Such decree cannot be avoided in a collateral action. Id.
8. Courts of chancery may decree ad interhin alimony, and enforce it by all
the means by which court, usually compel obedience, and if there be cross com-
plaints they may dismiss his for disobedience to such decree, and allow the
other to be prosecuted. Casteel v. Castesl, 752.
9. An appeal from an order for ad interim alimony may be taken imme-
diately. Id.
10. Alimony should not be declared a lien on the husband's lands. Id.
II. OCtrteg and Dower.
11. The burden of proof is upon the heirs who allege an ante-nuptial agree-
ment debarring the husband from a share of his wife's estate to show such
agreement and that it was in force at the wife's death. Graves v. Wakifield,
682.
12. The presumption as to the continued existence of such agreement from
the fact that it once existed is overcome by the fact that it is not found among
her papers. Id.
13. A married woman may surrender an ante-nuptial agreement to her hus-
band to be cancelled. Id.
111. Syparate Estate. See infra, 21-23.
14. A sum of money was paid to a husband and wife, and in consideration
thereof they covenanted to support and maintain one X. during her life. Hld,
that the wife's interest in the sum so paid is her separate estate, and that she
was liable upon the covenant as well as her husband. Houghton v. Mlilurn,
619.
15. Where, by the terms of a jointure, the husband was to account to the
wife for the income of her separate estate, but failed to do so, his representative,
after his decease, is liable to account therefor with interest calculated with
yearly rests. Middawgh v. Trinmer, 74.
16. Widow may reclaim from her husband's estate her separate money
loaned to him and applied to the paymnent of a mdrtgage on lands owned by
them as husband and wife. Greiner v. Greiner, 812.
INDEX.
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!V. Contracts, Conveyances, 6-c. See ante, 13, 14, 16.
17. Wife may mortgage her land to secure the debt of her husband or of any
other person. Merchant v. Thmnpson, 74.
18. A warrant of attorney by the wife to confess judgment is valid if the
contract to enforce which it is given is one which she is legally capable of
making. Heywood v. Shreve, 683.
19. If a husband uses the money of his wife, and thereby acquires title to
property, bona ,fide purchasers from him will be protected. Gornan v. Wood,
346.
20. Parol evidence is admissible to identify the debt of a husband for which
a mortgage was given by the wife. Hall v. Tay, 346.
21. A married woman is not personally liable on her contract though pos-
sessing a separate estate, and a suit is not maintainable thereon against her
personal representatives. Davis v. Smith, 159.
22. Her separate estate ceases to be such upon her death, and her general
creditors are entitled to share in its distribution. Id.
23. A suit to charge such estate may be revived against her heirs. Id.
24. Liability of married woman on contracts. id., note.
25. An insane husband of full age is under the control of his wife, and it is
not trespass for her to enter his father's house and remove him. Robinson v.
Frost, 682.
26. Action for slander of wife must be brought by husband and wife jointly,
and the claim for damages must be joint. Newcomer v. Kean, 484.
27. Where a sale from husband to wife is attacked the burden is on the
wife, or on a purchaser from her with notice to show bona fides and considera-
tion, and a mere recital of a valuable consideration in the bill of sale will not
support a verdict in her favor. Borton v. Dewey, 203.
ICE. See WATERS AND WATERCOURSES, 1, 2, 4.
INCUMBRANCE. See MORTGAGE.
INDICTMENT. See CRIMINAL LAW, 19, 22. LIBEL, 2.
INFANT. See EQUITY, 12, 13. GUARDIAN AND WAND. MUNICIPAL BONDS, 4.
FARENT AND CHILD.
1. May, during minority, rescind sale of his goods upon tender of the con-
sideration received, and may bring trover therefor, and such tender and
the demand for the goods may be made by an agent appointed by the infant.
Towle v. Dresser, 485.
2. No action lies to recover a minor's wages earned in violation of a statute
prohibiting the employment of minors in certain cases. Birkett v. Ciatterton,
136.
INJUNCTION. See ACTioN, 2. CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW, 3, 4, 23. EQUITY.
6, 8. TRADEMARK, 4, 6.
1. Will not be granted to restrain the use of land by an unlawful occupant
simply because such use, although not forbidden by law, is alleged by com-
plainant to be immoral and mischievous and calculated to Injare his reputation
in the community. Bodwell v. Crawford, 139.
2. A mortgagor who mortgages an embarrassed title or whose title becomes
clouded, is not entitled to an injunction agaidst foreclosure proceedings because
the property will not bring full value. .Am. Dock and hnp. Co. v. Trustees of
Public Schools, 620.
3. A court of equity will not enjoin a sale of lands under an execution
against one person merely because the title to the land is claimed by another,
unless the case is one of fraud or irreparable injury. Id.
4. Allegation that judgment-creditor of complainant's grantor has seized and
is about to sell complainant's lands is no ground for an injunction. Sheldon v.
Stokcs, 74.
INSANITY. See LUNATIC.
INSOLVENCY. See CoRrORATION, 26, 27.
Where a note is allowed against the estate of an insolvent surety, and after-
wards a dividend is paid on it by the estate of the insolvent principal, the
INDEX.
INSOLVENCY.
owner of the note is entitled to a dividend from the estate of the surety only on
the balance, and not on the amount first allowed. Lowell v. French, 683.
INSURANCE.
I. Marine. See ADmtUAlLTY, 6.
II. Ljf.
I. Equity will not relieve against forfeiture for non-payment of premium,
even though such non-payment be caused by the derangement of the mind of
the insured through illness, and the ignorance of the beneficiary of the existence
of the policy. K&in v. Nw York Lqfe Ins. Co., 74.
2. The courts will not relieve against a forfeiture for non-payment of premiums
which is stipulated for in the policy or in the premium note. Tompson v.
Knidekerbocl:er Ljfe Ins. Co., 271.
3. Neither a usage of the company to give notice, nor a usage to give days
of grace, will avail as a defence in case of non-pa ment for want of such
notice. Id.
4. Even if there is ground for relief against the forfeiture, such relief will not
be granted unless there had been a subsequent tender of the premiums due. Id.
5. The policy cannot be contradicted by proof of a cotemporaucous parol
agreement. Id.
6. Where one travels beyond the limits assigned by the policy and dies, a
permit subsequently given by a local agent in ignorance of the death, is not a
waiver of the forfeiture. Bennecze v. Conn. Mut. Ins. Co., 420.
7. If the ordinary habits of the insured were temperate, the fact that he had
been attacked by delirium tremens from an exceptional over indulgence, will
not render untrue an answer in his application to the effect that he was, and
had always been, of temperate habits. Knic:erbocker Life Ins. Co. v. Foley,
620.
S. A stipulation that if a policy should become voAd for any cause it should
not be revived by the issue of a renewal receipt, may be waived by an agent,
and the insurer, after receiving the premium and issuing the renewal receipt, is
estopped to deny the contract. Shfar v. PFkcnix Ins. Co., 140.
9. If a policy insures the life of A. for the use of B., A. cannot maintain an
action against the insurer for the premiums paid, although the policy never
took effect by reason of fraud by the insurer's agents. Trabandt v. Conn. Mit.
LZfe Ins. Co., 347.
10. Where a policy in the name of a wife on the life of her husband is paya-
ble to the wife if she survive her husband, and if she does not, then to her
children, the children are in the latter event the sole beneficiaries, and an
adopted child may take where the circumstances show such an intent. Martin
v. .zEtaa Life Ins. Co., 485.
11. An assignment of a policy for moneys advanced by the assignee, is valid
only to the extent of such advances, and the assignee must account to the rep-
resentatives of the assignor for the balance. Warnock v. Davis, 346.
12. Where a certificate of membersLip in a mutual company provided for an
assessment on the members, and payment of the sum collected within a certain
time after notice of death, a declaration containing no allegation of a neglect to
make the assessment and assigning no breach except of a promise to pay is
fatally defective, and such defect is not cured by a verdict. Curtis v. MAit.
Bn. Life ln. Co., 203.
13. A corporation for the mutual protection and relief of its members, and
for the payment of stipulated sums to the families of deceased members, belongs
to the class of corporations formed for purposes other than for profit. Ohio
v. Standard Lzfe Association, 620.
14. A certificate of membership In such a corporation by which the corpora-
tion in consideration of the payment by a member of a membership fee, annual
dues and a pro rata assessment with his fellow members to pay a sum of money
to the family of a deceased member, stipulates to pay at his death to his family
a sum of money, graduated by the number of members in his class, is a contract
of life insurance. Id.
15. Such a contract to pay in case of a member's death "to himself e
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assignees," "to his estate," "to his executors or administrators," or to any
person, whether a relation or not, who is not of his family or heirs, is against
public policy, and void. Ohio v. Standard Life Association, 620.
III. lire.
16. A verbal agreement to insure is binding. Bale v. St. Joseph . 6 M.
Ins. Co., 37, and note.
17. The only element of a valid contract wanting in such an agreement was
the nature of the risk. Held, That this might be inferred from the business
of the insurance company and the subject-matter of the insurance. Id.
18. Specific performance of such an agreement may be enforced after loss, by
decreeing payment of the money. Id.
19. The violation of conditions which would have been contained in the
policy if issued, is no defence to such agreement. Id.
20. Verbal assent of agent to additional insurance sufficient, though the policy
stipulates for endorsement of written consent. Id.
21. Company refusing to pay on other grounds cannot defend on ground of
delay in furnishing proofs. Id.
22. Insured may sue in his own name although the loss was payable to a
third person, if such third person consents to the suit. Coates v. Penna. Fire
Ins. Co., 747.
23. Where after the making of a contract of sale of a house, but before com-
pletion of the purchase, the house is damaged by fire and the vendor receives
the insurance money, the vendee is neither entitled to the insurance money nor
to reinstatement of the premises. Rayner v. Preston, 89, and note.
24. Furniture in a fire policy was described as " 11 contained in house No.
-, McMillen street." The insured, without the insurer's knowledge, removed
the furniture to a house in another street, where they were consumed. Held,
that the insured could recover on the policy. Lyons v. Providence Washington
lire Co., 139.
25. A condition in a policy that any one insuring in the company must give
notice of other insurance, is not restricted to other insurance effected prior to
the execution of the policy. Warwick: v. Jlonmouth Co. Fire Ins. Co., 683.
26. W"rhere there are two policies, each containing a condition rendering the
policy void in case of other insurance, the second policy does not invalidate the
first. Jersey City Ins. Co. v. Nichol, 620.
27. The second policy being void, there is no fraud in the statement in a
proof of loss under the first, that there is no other insurance. Id.
INTEREST. See BILLS AND NOTES, 5. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 2. CONTRACT,
5. CORPORATIONt, 10. EXECUTOR, 1, 5, 6, 11. FoaaER ADJUDICATION,
1, 3. HUSBAND AND WIE, 15. NATIONAL BANK, 2. TRUST, I. USURY.
INTERPLEADER. See WILL, 7.
INTOXICATING LIQUORS. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 8, 16.
A statute providing that "evidence of the sale or keeping of intoxicating
liquors for sale in any building, place or tenement, shall be prima fade evi-
dence that the sale or keeping is illegal," is not unconstitutional. State v.
Higgins, 140.
INTOXICATION. See CRIMINAL LAW, 31.
JOINTURE. See HUSBAND AND WIFE, 15.
JUDGMENT. See CONFLICT OF LAWS, 2. EQUITY, 1. Fonmu ADJUDICA-
TION, 2. HUSBAND AND WIFE, 18. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 2. Pos-
SESSION, 2. PRACTICE, 2. SET-OFF, 1.
1. Is beyond the control of the court after the term at which it was rendered
except as to certain mistakes of fact formerly remedied by writ of error coram
vobis but now remedied by motion. Bronson v. Sclulten, 347.
2. Neither the state statutes nor the practice of the state courts can control
the United States courts in this respect. Id.
INDEX.
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3. Negligence and laches of the party in discovering the mistake will bar
his right to relief. Bronson v. Shutten, 347.
4. Judgment for costs cannot, at a subsequent term, be modified so as to be
enforced against the equitable instead of the legal plaintiff. Boland v. Ben-
son, 621.
5. A judgment of revival does not validate or otherwise alter the nature or
effect of the original judgment. Weilletr v. Blanks, 547.
6. The fact that a plaintiff has appealed from a judgment in his favor, does
not prevent him from suing for its revival ; and such proceeding will not pre-
judice his rights on appeal. Id.
7. Judgments for money are prescribed by ten years from the date of their
rendition : and the prescription runs from the date of the signing of the judg-
ment by the inferior court, and not from that of its confirmation by the appel-
late tribunal. Id.
8. The pendency of an appeal by either party, even suspensive, does not
stay the course of prescription against a judgment. Id.
9. The owner of a city lot is not bound by a judgment in a mandamus pro-
ceeding to compel councils to levy an assessment thereon, to which proceeding
he was not a party. Pwrk v. Smith, 621.
JUDICIAL SALE. See MoRTGAGE, 5. SInamrrI's SALE. Wias., 22.
I. The doctrine of caveat emptor applies to an administrator's or executor's
sale. ones v. larnod".272.
2. A covenant of warranty enures to the benefit of a purchaser at a judicial
sale. lViliaraq v. Berg, 753.
JURISDICTION. See COURTS. EQUITY, 2, 5, 12. HUSBANiD AND WIPE, 2.
JUROR AND JURY. See CRIMINAL LAW7, 9, 10. VERDIcT, 1, 2.
1. lisconduct of jury may be shown in a civil case by affidavits of jurors,
and if they refuse to give affidavits, they may be called and examined by the
trial judge. lldtrnore v. Ball, 742, and note.
2. For a refusal ot the trial judge so to do, the appellate court will order a
new trial. Id.
3. Where one respondent peremptorily challenges a juror, and the other
desires him to sit, it is proper for the court to excuse him. State v. 1ileaker,
683.
4. An opinion to disqualify a ju or must be more than a transitory inclination
of the mind. It must be an abiding bias as to the guilt or innocence of the
accused upon the evidence substantially as expected to be presented on the
trial. Id.
JUSTICE OF THE PEACE. See CONTEMPT, 2.
LACHES. See GUARDIAN AND WARD, 2. JUDGMENT, 3.
ANDLORD AND TENANT. See WATERS AND WATERCOURSES, 9.
1. A Catholic priest, removable at the will of the bishop, is not a tenant of the
parsonage, and is not entitled to the statutory notice to quit. Chatard v.
O'Donoroan, 461, and note.
2. A lessee is not released by the fact that a prior tenant whose term has
expired holds over without right. Field v. Be,-rick, 203.
3. Where a lessee for years, who has covenanted to pay taxes, leases to
another for the whole of his unexpired term by a lease which covenants to pay
an increased rent, and the taxes with stipulations for entry for breach of cove-
nant, this is a sub-lease and not an assignment, and the sub-lessee is not liable
to the original lessor upon the covenant to pay taxes in the original lease.
Dunlap v. Bllard, 347.
4. A reletting of the premises to the tenant after recovering a judgment of
possession against him, is a satisfaction of the judgment. Barney v. Cain, 347.
5. The lien of a landlord -will not be defeated by the conversion of the pro-
perty of a tenant into money by a receiver under an order of court, but will
attach to the proceeds in the receiver's hands. Gilbert v. Greenbaum, 547.
6. Where a landlord takes possession of and gins and bales a crop which
has been mortgaged and then abandoned by the tenant, he may, as against the
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mortgagee, retain out of the proceeds the expense of preparing the crop for
market as well as the rent. Fry v. Ford, 753.
LARCENY. See CRIMINAL LAW, 5.
LEASE. See GUARDIAN AND WARD, 3. LANDLORD AND TENANT. SALE, 1, 3.
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE, 5, 6.
LEGACY. See EBAOUTOR, 5. TAx, 5. WILL, 1, 4, 7, 10, 11.
Is not to be considered a charge upon real estate unless the intention to
charge it is expressly declared or fairly inferable from the will. Owens v.
ClaMyor, 348.
LIBEL. See ATTORNEY, 7.
1. A publication is libellous if, without charging an indictable offence, ic
falsely and maliciously imputes conduct tending to injure reputation, to cause
social degradation, or to excite public distrust, contempt or hatred. State v.
Spear, 140.
2. An indictment for libel is good if it charges the publication of matter not
libellous per se, but charges such publication with proper inducements and
innuendoes to set forth and explain the defamatory statements of the publica-
tion. Id.
3. Whether words declared upon are libellous, is a question for the jury and
not for the court. Beazeley v. Reid, 485.
4. An attorney is liable for a defamatory statement contained in a declara-
tion in an. action where such statement was not pertinent or material. Me-
Laughlin v. Cowley, 272
LICENSE. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 6. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 14.
PLEADING, 1. TRESPASS, 2.
LIEN. See BAILMENT, 3. BANK, 2. HUSBAND AND WIFE, 10. MECHANIC'S
LIEN. STOPPAGE IN TRANSITU. VENDOR AND VENDrEE. 1-5, 8.
LIFE TENANT.
1. Is entitled to dividends on stocks, even if they are extraordinarily large,
if they are intended by the corporation as a distribution of income. flillen v.
Guerrard, 38].
2. Respective rights of life-tenant and remainderman in stock. id., note.
LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1. UNITED
STATES COURTS, 3. VENDOR AND VENDEE, 4.
1. A promise to pay "as soon as possible" a debt already bared by the
statute, will remove the bar. Norton v. Shepard, 204.
2. The mere addition of a seal to a promissory note will not prevent it from
being barred by the statute unless the fact of its being a sealed instrument is
recited in the body of the note. Chambers v. Kingsbury, 343; Sk'ine v.
Lewis, 480.
3. A note and mortgage barred by the statute may be revived by an ad-
mission of indebtedness by the Inortgagors, and the priority of the lien will
be preserved as against liens taken before the mortgage became barred, and
not foreclosed until it is revived. Kerdt v. Porte7field, 548.
4. Payment by a principal debtor which will take a case out of the statute
as to him, will have the same effect as to his surety who is present. Gl c: v.
Crist, 140.
5. A clear and unequivocal admission of a debt will take it out of the opera-
tion of the statute, without, an express promise, but the admission must be so
distinct as to remove hesitation as to the debtor's meaning. Palmer v. Gilles-
pie, 621.
6. In action against one of two joint makers of a note evidence is admissible
of part payment by co-maker, since deceased,. and of admissions of the maker
sued. Burgeon v. Bixler, 75.
7. Where collateral is given for several notes the proceeds of such collateral
should, in the absence of any special direction, be applied as a partial pay-
ment on each note, and thus prevent the running of the statute as to all. Tay-
lor v. Foster, 813.
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S. Beduins to run in favor of a fraudulent conveyance from the time the
creditor had a right of action to test its validity. Ravey v. Quillhl, 753.
9. Adverse possession by fraudulent grantees will avail, although s,,ch
grantees were members of the grantor's family. Id.
tO. Occupation by husband and wife, where the legal title is in the wife,
enures to her benefit. Id.
11. Commences to run against coupon attached to municipal bond from ma-
ttrity of the coupon. Town of Koshdoaoag v. Bnrton, 54 3.
LIS PENDENS.
1. The doctrine of lis pendens cannot be extended to support a bill against
third persons for the value of wood cut during proceedings involving the title
to the land. Gardner v. Ppclhoaw, 264.
2. A purchaser of land is charged with notice of an action affecting the same
from the time the petition is filed, although the action was not properly
indexed, and the notice was not served until after the purchase. Haverly v.
Alcott, 813.
LOAN. See ConRovIoN}'r , 10.
LOCAL ACTION. See AcrxoN, 3, 5.
LUNATIC. See HusuBAD AND WiFE. 5.
1. Not liable upon his accommodation endorsement of a promissory note even
to a onafide purchaser of the note without notice. t'ireach v. First .National
Bank of Easton, 29.
2. Extent of liability upon contracts. Id., note.
3. Will be bound by reasonable contract made in the ordinary course of bu !-
ness with parties i-norant of the lunacy, and who cannot be placed in statn q1o.
Ariott v. Crtal, 548.
4. Where a grantor in a deed labors under an insane delusion as to a par-
ticular person, and the deed is an act referable to that state of mind, the (eed
is void, and in such caxe the rule that the grantor must be proved to be insane
or under undue influence at the very time the deed was executed, is inappli-
eable. Jones v. .Jones, 666, and note.
5. It is sulffcient to invalidate a deed executed for an inadequate considera-
tion by a person of weak intellect, to show that the grantee held a situation of
confidence with respect to him, and in such case the burden of proof to show
consideration is on the grantee. Id.
MIALICIOUS PROSECUTION.
1. In an action for false imprisonment proof of the circumstances of plaintiff's
family, and of the filthy condition of the jail ued for the imprisonment, is
admissible upon the question of mental anguish, &c. Fenelon v. Bntts, 141.
2. In such action statements of the attorney of defendant in reference to a
second imprisonment of plaintiff then threatened, arc admissible if such attorney
was then acting for defbndant or was a co-conspirator with him, or made the
statements in his presence and with his assent. Id.
3. Proof of defendant's good faith is not admissible to mitigate compensatory
damages, including those allowed for injury to the feelings. Id.
4. Jf a mortgage creditor contract with his debtor not to enforce his mortgage
within a given time but subsequently does so, the latter has a right to sue for
the actual injury without alleging malice or want of probable cause. Jnteur v.
Bodln, 272.
5. In ease of malice or want of probable cause punitive damages may be
added,. Id.
6. In an action for the wrongful seizure of a tradesman's stock, profits which
le was making may be considered by the jury in estimating the magnitude of
the injury. Id.
7. If tie defendant has acted in bad faith, or been stubbornly litigious,
counsel fees may be proved and allowed as part of the damages. Id.
S. In an action for maliciously attaching plaintiff's goods if there was no
probable cause the jury may presume malice. Bozenan v. Shaw, 348.
9. The advice of counsel is no protection if the prosecutor believed th
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prosecution would fail, and was actuated by a desire to injure the accused.
Sharpe v. Johnstone, 576, and note.
10. Malice is not an inference of law from the want of probable cause, but
may be inferred from the facts which go to establish want of probable cause.
Such inference is for the court and not the jury. Id.
1I. Separate damages may be recovered for an indictment after discharge by
the committing magistrate, if procured by the prosecutor, but not if he was
summoned as a witness without his procurement. Id.
12. Where there are two successive indictments for the same offence, but a
trial on one only, they cannot be regarded as two separate prosecutions. Id.
13. Evidence of thcts tending to show tile guilt of plaintiff, although inad-
missibIe to show probable cause, should be admitted as bearing on the question
of actual guilt. -Newton v. lYarear, 513.
14. In an action for malicious prosecution in bringing an action of trover the
verdict in the trover case is not conclusive upon the question of actual guilt.
Id.
15. Advice of counsel upon a full disclosure of facts is a good defence. Id.
16. If the plaintiff was in fact guilty of the crime chargcd no recovery can
be had. Parkhurst v. Alastellar, 813.
17. Mental suffering and injury to feelings constitute elements of actual or
compensatory damages. d.
18. Exemplary damages may be allowed by way of punishment. Id.
19. TE AcTION FOR THE M oALIIOUS PROSECUTION OF A CIVIL SUIT,
281,353.
fANDAMUS. See JUDGMENT, 9. MUNICIPAL BONDS, 3
1. Will lie to compel a county treasurer to transfer to tile state treasury the
state's proportion of taxes collected by him. Ohio v. Staley, 621.
2. A petition showing the collection of such taxes is not defective for want
of an averment that they remain in the county treasury. Id.
3. Any court having jurisdiction may by mandamus compel a municipal cor-
poration to levy a tax to pay its debts, but only in the manner and to the extent
of the power conferred on it by law. State v. Rainey, 480.
MARITIME LIEN. See ADIItRALTY, IV.
MARKET OVERT. See SET-OFF, 2.
MARRIAGE. See DEED, 8. HUSBAND AND WIFE, I.
MASTER AND SERVANT. See DAMAGES, 5. PARENT AND CHILD, 1-3.
I. Where an employee, under a monthly employment, says to his employer
that he desires to have his employment made more permanent, and thereupon a
specified amount per year is agreed upon, a hiring for a year may be inferred.
Bascom v. Strillito. 272.
2. A contract by an employee to give two weeks' notice or forfeit two weeis
pay does not apply to a temporary absence, and while the employee may be
discharged for such offence his pay cannot be forfeited. Heber v. Fax Menuf.
Co., 204.
3. Where a servant engages for a particular time and improperly leaves
befoi e that time, lie cannot recover compensation for his services. fHibbard v.
Kirby, 754.
4. An employer who continues an employee in his service after learning of
negligence or misconduct on the part of the latter, is estopped from subse
quently complaining of such negligence or misconduct. M31arshall v. Sims, 141.
5. Where a servant operating machinery is, by reason of his youth and
inexperience, not aware of the danger, it is the duty of the master to warn
him, notwithstanding the existence of that which renders the machinery
dangerous is known to the servant. Dowllng v. Allen, 348.
6. A foreman in charge of a distinct piece of wori in a large foundry is as
to those under him a vice principal to their employer, not-withstanding that he
is subordinate to a general foreman of the entire establishment. Id.
7. The rule that one riding in a conveyance has no action for an injury
caused by the driver's negligence, does not apply to passengers in a public con-
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veyance, even though they have chartered the conveyance. Cuddy v. Horn,
302, and note.
8. A section foreman of a railroad is not a fellow servant with the switch-
man. Hall v. Mo. Pac. Railroad Co., 485.
9. A scction hand injured by the negligence of the section boss in running a
"crank car" backwards, may maintain an action against the company. Rail-
road Co. v. sVelson, 76.
t0. A railroad receiving from another railroad for transportation a car in
apparently good condition, is not bound, for the protection of its employees, to
apply the tests proper to be used in the original construction of the car. Bal-
loa v. C. 4- NM Railroad Co., 421.
11. A railway company is responsible for the act of its clerk in endeavoring
to corruptly influence a witness in a case against the city. Chicago City Rail-
way Co. v. 11cMahon, 684.
12. An employer is not liable for injuries resulting from the negligence of a
contractor, although the employer may have known that the contractor was of
bad character. Dobson v. Iron Co., 76.
13. Whqiether a person in the performance of work for another is a servant
or contractor, depends upon whether he repreents the will of the principal in
the management and details of the work. Id.
'MECHANIC'S LIEN.
1. One employed for an indefinite time to direct the work in a mine, with
authority to employ and discharge miners and purchase supplies, and who, in
the performance of those duties did some manual labor, is entitled to a lien
under a statute giving a lien to any person who should perform any work or
labor upon any mine. Flagstaff" Silver M1ining Co. v. Collins, 141.
2. One who performs labor for a contractor in the erection of a building is
entitled to a lien, although no express contract for payment was made. Foerder
v. Hlreaer, 421.
3. The fact that a laborer also acted as overseer of other workmen will not
defeat his right to a lien. Id.
4. A mechanic may be estopped by acts from asserting a lien, although he
made no express promise not to assert such lien. lVest v. Klotz. 141.
5. Prices agreed upon between the contractor and a material man are not
binding upon the owner, but are prima facie evidence of the market value.
Deardorff v. Everhartt, 348.
6. Declarations of the contractor are not evidence against the owner. Id.
7. A lien cannot be enforced for materials furnished to the contractor but not
put into the building. Id.
8. M nCiANIcs' LIEN ON PERSONAL PROPERTY, 151, 209.
MESNE PROFITS. See EJECTMENT.
MINES AND MINING. "See MECHANIC's LIEN, 1. SPECIFIC P n R.tANon,
6. UNITED STATLS, 2, 3.
1. Where the original locators of a mining claim who have neglected to
perform the annual work required by the Act of Congress of May 10th 1872,
resume such work before a re-location by other parties, such resumption will
continue their claim until the end of the year in which the work was resumed.
The Act of June 6th 1874, makes no change in this respect. Bell; v.
Meagher, 204.
2. A re-location by other parties during the year in which work is resumed
gives the new parties no right to the possession, even though they remain in
posession after the expiration of such year. Id.
3. In such case the original owners by a peaceable entry on their claim may
secure a good right which will enable them to hold the claim as against such
other parties. Id.
'MI~NOR. See INFANT. GUARDIAN AND WARD. PARENT AND CHILD.
MISREPRESENTATION. See FRAUD, 1-3.
MORTGAGE. SeeATTACH3MENT, 8. DEnTOR ANbROEDIT1O, 10, 11. EQUrITY,
18. EVIDENCE, 11. FiXTURES, 1. HSBAND AND WIFE, 17, 20. IN-
JUNCTION, 2. LANDLORD AND TENANT, 6. LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF, 3.
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PARTNERSHIP, 16. PAYMENT, 1. PLEDGE, 6. SALE, 1, 2. SUBEOGA-
TION, 2, 3. SURETY, 11. TROVER, 6.
I. Generally.
1. Where there is a public office for recording mortgages a failure to record
will postpone the lien as to a subsequent bona fide mortgagee, even though such
recording is not required by statute. Neslin Y. Wells, 273.
2. An agreement by a purchaser to pay an existing mortgage debt as part
of the consideration may be enforced by the mortgagee, but not if the convey-
ance in which such agreement is inserted is itself a mortgage. Bassett v.
Bradley, 273.
3. The items of indebtedness need not be stated in a mortgage if the total
amount is named, and in the absence of fraud the debt may be identified by
parol. Wood v. Waher, 204.
4. The rule that the holder of commercial paper, seeking to enforce in equity
a mortgage security therefor, is subject to any defence which would be good
against the mortgage in the hands of the mortgagee, has no application to deed s
of trust given to secure railroad coupon bonds. Peoria and Sprinqfield Rail-
road Co. v. Jhompson, 684.
5. Where a railroad, its appurtenances and franchises, are mortgaged as a
whole, there is no power or authority to sell them separately, and such pro-
perty, not being, strictly speaking, either real or personal estate, is sold on
foreclosure p!roceedings without any right of redemption. Id.
6. The giving of further time for the payment of an existing debt, is a valu-
able consideration sufficient to support the mortgageas a purchase for value.
Cass Cournty v. Oldham, 684.
7. If taken as security until solvency of proposed surety is ascertained, it
will be presumed to be discharged upon the acceptance of the surety. Baile
Y. St. Joseph I. and M. Ias. Co., 37.
8. In a foreclosure suit the amount due, the day for payment and an order
of sale upon default may be embraced in one decree. CMcago, D. and V. Rail-
road Co. v. Fosdick, 421.
9. An error in such decree, in the finding of the amount due. will vitiate all
subsequent proceedings,. Id.
10. Where a railroad mortgage gave to trustees power to foreclose upon
request of a majority of bondholders, they have no power to proceed without
such request. Id.
11. A mortgagee who has paid a prior incumbrance, is entitled to repayment
thereof when the mortgagor comes to redeem. McConaick v. Kinox, 486.
12. Where an assignee of notes secured by mortgage fails to take and record
an assignment of the mortgage, and the mortgagee subsequently acquires the
equity of redemption, enters a release of the mortgage and gives a new mort-
gage, the latter mortgagee acquires a prior lien. Ogle v. Tuapin, 486.
13. Where the trustee in a deed of trust releases without the consent of the
party secured, a subsequent incumbrancer without notice cannot acquire a prior
lien, but if the party secured has authorized the trustee's act, or failed to
promptly repudiate it, he is estopped from denying its validity. Baror v.
Scottish Am. Mllortgage Co., 485.
14. In equity parol evidence is admissible to reform a mortgage. Tabor v.
Cilley, 75.
15. But equity will not reform a mortgage given by one insolvent if the
rights of third persons would be injuriously afected thereby. Id.
16. A mortgage lien purchased by the owner of the equity of redemption
will be kept alive in equity for the protection of the purchaser whether the pur-
chaser takes an assignment of the lien or a release of the mortgagee's interest.
-zffy v. MIfcGuimess, 814.
17. After the expiration of the statutory time to redeem property sold under
foreclosure proceedings, the mortgagor cannot maintain a bill to redeem on the
ground that the riuht of redemption was not secured to him by the decree.
Burley v. Fint, 622.
II Of Chattels.
i8. Where a mortgage is made of chattels which both parties know belong
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to a third person, the mortgagor cannot afterwards, as against tue mortgagee,
deny his ownership. Harvey v. Harvey, 814.
19. A paper as follows: " Received of J. J. Findley and W. F. Findley,
,25 in full payment for one black cow, about six years old, and one calf, now
belonging to said cow, about two months old, said cow being the cow I bought
of Bub Reed. It is agreed by the purchasers of the above property and Austin
Hughes, the signer uf' this receipt, that said Hughes shall retain the property
and use the same from this date to the first day of October next, at which time,
should the said Hugbes pay to said Findleys $25, then tie property to remain
said Hughes's, but if the money be not paid that day the property to be delivered
up to the said Findleys." Held, to he a mortgage. Fndley v. Deal, 814.
20. Purchase by mortgagee at his own sale under a chattel mortgage, will
not be set aside when made with the consent of the mortgagor. Goodell v.
Dewey, 75.
II Of Realty.
21. A mortgage of lands not owned by the mortgagor, will become r lien
thereon the moment the mortgagor acquires title to the land, and it cannot be
rendered subordinate to the lien of subsequent judgments. ice v. Kelso, 754.
22. Holders of judgment liens, not made parties in the foreclosure of a supe-
rior mortgage, have their right of redemption, but cannot acquire titles under
execution sales that will defeat the mortgage title. Id.
23. If a mortgagee takes possession and permits the mortgagor to take the
profits, he will be required to account, at the suit of other creditors, for the
profits, but in the absence of fraud he will be required to account for only such
as are actually received. Ely v. Turpin, 684.
24. In the ordinary case of a purchase of an equity of redemption from a
mortgagor, with a provision in the deed that the grantee assumes and agrees to
pay the mortgage debt, no right of action an the promise accrues to the mort-
gagee. 11ech v. Ensqn, 608.
25. Of an undivided moiety in land will not be transferred to a particular
part allotted to the mortgagor in severalty by a subsequent partition to which
the mortgagee was not a party. Jackmaan v. Beek, 349.
.MUNICIPAL BOND. See CO tFLIC or LAWS, 2. EQuiry, 2. LItTATIONS,
STATUTE OF, 11,
1. Good in the hands of an innocent purchaser, although issued by a court
de jacto hut not de fure. Ralls Co. v. Douglass, 814.
2 Where by statute authority is given to execute bonds under seal, the
requirement of a seal is directory merely, and the omission of a seal does not
invalidate the bonds. Draper v. Tewn qf ,pringport, 273.
3. A statute authorized precincts of counties to vote for the issue of bonds in
aid of internal improvement, and provided that upon such vote the county
eommissioners should issue special bonds for such precinct and levy a special
tax upon the property within such precinct. Held, that suit upon such bonds
should be brought against the county and not against the precinct. Hld
fisrthr, that it was no defence to an action upon such bonds in a federal court
that the state statute had provided a remedy by mandamus. Davenport v.
County qf Dodqe, 622.
4. Where municipal authorities have upon forged assignments cancelled
ecrtificates of stock belonging to a minor, and issued new certificates to the
assignee, they may replace the certificates belonging to the minor and pay to
his guardian the arrears of interest. Coancil af Baltimnore v. Ketclsum, 486.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION. See COXNTITUTIONAL LAW, 7. EQUITY, 2.
MiANDAMUS, 3. N tEGLIGENCE, 9. TAXATION, 8, 9.
1. Is liable in damages for injury to abutting lot caused by a failure, in rais-
ing the grade of the street, to restrain the earth within the limits of the street.
Broad, el v. City of Kansas, 539.
2. In a suit for such damage a record of a judgnent against the lot holder
upon tax bills for the work is not admissible. Id.
3. Liable for injurs, to lot caused by negligent excavation of street although
the lot does not immediately abut upon the treet. Keatling v. Cincinnati, 622.,
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4. Such liability extends to injury to improvements on the lot, if the ownrer
is not chargeable with negligence in making them. Keating v. Cincinnati, 622.
5. May do an authorized act by resolution as well as by ordinance. State
v. City of Passaic, 684.
6. The judgment of commissioners of assessment on matters of fact will
not be reversed except for clear error. Id.
7. Not liable for mere slipperiness of highway from snow or ice. Smith v.
Bangor, 74.
8. Notice to municipal officers must be notice of the identical defect and not
merely of a cause likely to produce it. Id.
9. Notice cannot be proved by the admission of a municipal officer, though
his declarations accompanying his official acts are admissible. Id.
10. Not liable for injury to scholar through a defect iii the heating apparatu;
of a school which is voluntarily maintained by the corporation under a general
statute. Wixon v. City of Newport, 548.
11. A city officer taking earth from private property for use in improving
the streets is liable in trespass, but the city is not. Rowland v. City of Gal-
latin, 685.
12. Where a city builds a bridge upon a street, and thereby cuts off access
to a house along an intersecting street, except by means of stairs, the city is
liable to the owner of the house in damages. Rigney v. ( ticago, 483.
13. A county is not liable upon a warrant drawn upon a fund which has
become exhausted, and which the authorities have no power to replenish.
eoody v. Cass County, 486.
14. A statutory authority to license certain trades, excludes the power to
license trades not enumerated. City of Cairo v. Bross, 273.
15. The debts of a municipal corporation are not extinguished by the repeal
of its charter, and upon its re-Incorporation under a new name, pending suits
may be revived against such new corporation. O' Conner v. City of M3esplds,
181, and note.
16. A legislative provision exempting such new corporation from liability for
such debts is unconstitutional. Id.
17. Whether the legislature may withhold the taxing power for such debts
not decided. Id.
18. The courts will not take notice, ex propria sstu, of municipal ordinances.
Laviosa v. Chicago, St. L. and N. 0. Railroad Co., 549.
19. Where restrictions are placed by law on the erection of certain structures,
there is an implied authority to erect them provided the restrictions be complied
with. Id.
20. Without general legislation declaring all of its class a nuisance, a city
cannot declare any particular thing to be one. id.
21. A municipal ordinance authorizing an unreasonable or oppressive use of
a street by a railroad is void. Id.
MURDER. See CIMINAL LAW, VI.
NAME. See TRADEMARK, 5.
1. The term "junior," is no part of a man's name, and if a son who bears
the same name as his father, buys land in his own name without the designation
of "junior," there is no presumption that he intended the father should take
title. Simpson v. Dix, 349.
2. In such case evidence is admissible to show who is the grantee. Id.
NATIONAL BANKS. See BANK'. CORrOnATION, 3, 4.
1. A national bank, in voluntary liquidation under sect. 5220 Rev. Stat.,
is not thereby dissolved as a corporation, but may sue and be sued, and it is no
defence to a suit by a creditor that he has also filed a creditor's bill to enforce
the individual liability of the stockholder. Central N'at. Bank v. Conn. Mfut.
Life Ins. Co., 76.
2. The fact that by the law of the state in which a national bank is situated,
the purchase of business paper from the payee at a greater rate of discount
than the legal interest., is not usurious, will not relieve the bank from the
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penalty imposed by sect. 5198 Rev. Stat. Nvat. Bank of Gloversville v. John-
son, 205.
3. Sect. 5228 U. S. Rev. Stat. does not make property belonging to others
found in the custody of a national bank at the time of its suspension, under
contracts other than special deposit, liable for the debts of the bank. Louisi-
ana Ice Co. v. State .Nat. Bank, 135.
NAVIGABLE STREAM. See WATERS AND WATERCOURSES, 1, 3, 7.
NEGLIGENCE. See AGENT, 4. BANK, 1. BILLS AD NOTES, 9. COMION
CAERIEn, 3, 4. JUDGMIENT, 3. 'ASTER AND SERVANT, 4-10, 12, 13.
MUNICIPAL CORPOEATION, 1, 3, 7, 10. RAILROAD, 3-10. STREET, 1, 2.
TELEGRAPH, 5-8.
I. Where an injury is caused by the successive negligent acts of two per-
sons, and the first is compelled to pay damages, he cannot recover indemnity
against the other. CAurdcill v. Holt, 273.
2. Owner of vessel liable for injury caused by negligence of master, to pas-
sengers who had chartered the vessel. Cuddy v. Horn, 302, and note.
3. Where a collision occurs through the fault of both vessels, a passenger
injured may maintain a joint action against them. Id.
4. The mere fat of the explosion of a boiler raises a presumption of negli-
gence against the owner whose servants are operating it, and the burden is on
him to disprove such negligence. Rose v. Stephewns & Condit Trans. Co.,
522.
5. General principles governing suits for damages caused by explosions. Id.,
note.
6. In an action against a railroad company for an injury causing death,
where it appears that the deceased was found on a siding under the cars at a
place not a public crossing, the burden is on plaintiffs to prove negligence on
the part of the railroad employees. State v. Balt. 6- Oho Railroad Co., 754.
7. The fact that the cars had no brakeman on them while being run on the
siding, is not sufficient to charge the defendant with negligence. Id.
8. In an action against a railroad for killing live stock, negligence on the
part of the company must be shown, it is not inferred from the mere fact of
ie killing. P. C. 6- St. L. Railway Co. v. MeMillan, 422.
9. In an action against a city for injury by an obstruction of a stream, the
failure of the plaintift to use ordinary diligence and incur moderate expense,
if by so doing he could have prevented the injury, is contributory negligence.
Nochl v. City of Musocatint, 754.
10. The doctrine of riparian proprietorship does not apply to a stream
meandering through a city. Id.
11. Owners of a wharf are liable to a customs officer who visits it in the
performance of his duties, for injuries received because of its unsafe condition.
Low v. Grand Trunk Railway Co., 76.
12. When it is the duty of such officer to watch for smugglers, the fact that
lie does not carry a light in passing over the wharf at night is not contributory
negligence. Id.
13. The fact that a person noticed, on entering a building, that there was
ice on a sidewalk in front of the door, is not conclusive evidence in an action
against the owner for an injury sustained on his way out, that he was not in
the exercise of due care in attempting to pass over the sidewalk. Dewire v.
Bailey, 349.
NtGOTIABLE INSTRUIENT. See BILL OF LASING. BILLS AND NOTES.
1. In the case of a bona fide purchase of stolen coupons after maturity, there
is no presumption that they had been negotiated before maturity, and the
owner, upon proof of the theft, may recover from the purchaser. Htinckley v.
Merchants' Nat. Bank, 349.
2. Certificate of stock with blank power of attorney is not a negotiable
instrument. 'Yote to Chercry v. Frost, 57.
3. Where one, for a present consideration, in good faith purchases bonds in
the regular course of business from a railroad company, such bonds will be
regarded as having been issued for money, labor or property "actually received
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and applied," within the meaning of a constitutional provision prohibiting the
issue except for such considerations. Peoria and Springfield Railroad Co. v.
Thonapson, 685.
NEWTRIAL. See CnItNINAL LAw, 15, 16. Juny, 2. VERDICT, 1.
1. Where the evidence is undisputed the court may direct the jury to enter
a general or special verdict or may itself find the fact and render judgment,
and it is intimated herein that after setting aside a special verdict as contrary
to the evidence, the court might either grant a new trial, direct the proper ver-
dict or render judgment according to the evidence. Gammon v. Abrams, 141.
2. A party who, after a special verdict has been set aside, does not ask for a
new trial, waives it. Id.
3. A "reaper and self-binder," was delivered to a conditional purchaser
in July, and used in the harvest of that season, and found defective. In
January or February following, the vendor's agent called on the purchaser in
relation to payment for the machine, and the purchaser said he would give
nothing for it; but he still kept it and did not offer to return it until the fol-
lowing April. Held, that there was no error in setting aside a finding by the
jury that the machine was returned in a reasonable time, and rendering judg-
ment for its value. Id.
NOTICE. See AGENT, S. IS FENDENS. POSSESSION, 1.
1. The record of a deed which is void for insufficiency of description, is not
constructive notice. Cass Co. v. Oldham, 685.
2. Two executors sold realty; a third party bought; on the same day lie
conveyed the land to one of the executors ; some two years thereafter the latter
sold to a purchaser for value ; the deeds all purported to be for a fair and
valuable consideration. Held, that the facts appearing from the deeds, were
not sufficient to put the purchaser on notice that the sale was by an executor
to himself. Cox v. Barber, 350.
NUISANCE. See MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 20. SHERIFF, 5. STREET, 1.
WATERS AND WATERCOURSES, 7.
1. When an erection in the highway is not a nuisance per se, the question as
to whether it is a nuisance is one of fact for the jury. City of Allegheny v.
Zimzerman, 622.
2. The erection of a liberty pole in a street, being sanctioned by'uniform
custom, is not a nuisance per se. Id.
OFFICER. See ACKNOWLEDGMENT, 1. CONTRACT, 7. CORPORATION, 11, 15.
EXECUTION, 8. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 8, 11. TRESPASS, 1.
An official bond for the discharge of the duties of an office according to law
embraces duties added by subsequent statutes. Dawson v. The State, 421.
ORDINANCE. See ERRORS AND APPEALS, 12. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 22.
PARENT AND CHILD. See CONFLICT OF LAws, 3. DEED, 2. DURESS, 3.
EQUITY. 12. HUSBAND AND WIFE, 25. INSURANCE, 10. RAILROAD, 3. 4.
WILL, 4. 5.
1. If a minor hire himself out to service, his father may claim the wages under
the contract or the value of his son's time, less whatever time was allowed him
by the employer. Sherloch v. Kimmell, 685.
2. If a father hire his minor son for an indefinite period, the employer may
discharge the son at any time without notice. Id.
3. In an action by.tlw father to recover the son's wages, statements made by
the son arc not admissible in evidence against the father. Id.
4. In deciding as to the custody of infants, the chancellor must act as
humanity, respect for parental affection and regard for the infant's best interests
may prompt. ]Terser v. Ford, 350.
5. As against strangers the father, if of good moral character and able to
support the child, is entitled to its custody ; and, as between father and mother
or other near relation, the father is generally to be preferred. Id.
6. The words " child or children" in the by-laws of a benevolent association
providing for the payment of benefits do not include grandchildren. Wintor v.
Odd Fellows Beneficial Association, 205.
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PARTIES. See ARREST, 1.
PARTITION. See MORTGAGE, 25.
PARTNERSHIP. See ATTORNEY, $. DEBTOR AND CREDITOR, 12. FRAUDS,
STATUTE OF, 3. TRADEMARK, 5.
1. The funds of an insolvent firm paid by one partner upon his private debt
without the consent of his copartner, may be attached at the suit of a firm
creditor, even though the copartner was surety for the payment of such debt,
and the money was collected upon a draft in the firm name. Jomson v. Her-
sy, 486.
2. The interest of a copartner in the partnership property may, in Rhode
Island, be attached and sold at the suit of his individual creditor, and ie pur-
chaser at such sale is entitled to delivery of the property and becomes tenant
in common with the other partners, subject to the partnership equities. Pan-
dall v. Johnson, 142.
3. A general assignment of all the assignor's estate, except what is exempt
from attachment, conveys his interest as partner in the property of his co-
partnership. Stiness v. Pierce, 549.
4. The seizure and removal of firm property on an execution against one
partner for his private debt constitutes a trespass for which the officer is liable
in an action. Sanborn v. Royce, 799, and note.
5. A partner is liable individually as a stockholder to creditors of a corpora-
tion in which the partnership own stock. Bray's Adt'r v. Selignzan's Adr'r,
686.
6. A member of a voluntary associaion is not liable for a debt incurred by
a committee, if it does not appear that he was present at the appointment of the
committee, and there is no evidence of the latter's authority. lolger v. Ray,
543.
7. When it is.proved that the name of one sued as a partner, appeared as
such in an adverti-ement in a paper to which he subscribed, and also on the let-
ter heads of the firm, evidence of the general understanding and report of the
community where the partnership business was carried on, is also admissible
Rizer v. Jaess, 142.
8. Where one is held out as a member of a firm with his own assent, he is
responsible to every creditor or customer of the firm for all its liabilities. Id.
9. A retiring partner who fails to give notice of his retirement, continues to
be liable to persons dealing with the firm, and it is immaterial whether such
failure was negligent or unavoidable. Oil v. Ita'mey, 118, and note.
10. It is the duty of such partner to give notice to the public as well as to those
who have dealt with the firm. d.
11. The questions of good faith in the retirement and of actual notice to the
plaintifi', are for the jury. Id.
12. All the partners are liable for the wrongful seizure of a stranger's goods
under an attachment issued by the authority of one partner alone, for the recovery
of a partnership debt. Ku/n v. ITei!, 77.
13. Real estate purchased with partnership funds for partnership purposes,
although the title he taken in the name of one partner, is treated in equity as
personal property iv necessary for the settlement of the partnership, and in case
of death a sale of such real'estate by the surviving partner will be enforced by
compelling a conveyance of the legal title. Shanks v. Klein, 77.
14. An appropriation of partnership funds by one partner to the payment
of a debt which the creditor knew was the private debt of the partner, is pre-
sumptively fraudulent, but such presumption may he rebutted by proof of
authority, consent or ratification by the other parties. Johnson v. Cric/ton,
350.
15. Whether such authority or consent was given is a question for the jury.
Id.
16. A mortgage to a firm without naming the individual partners is valid,
and may be foreclosed. Chicago Lzonber Co. v. AslIworth, 142.
17. One partner cannot, without the consent of the others, sell the partner-
ship business, and if he attempts to do so a constructive trust attaches to the
property in the hands of the purchhser. Drake v. Thyng, 422.
VOL. XXX.-108
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18. After dissolution, one partner cannot bind the others by note in firm
name. a ller v. Davis, 707, and note.
19. A dissolution is not ipso facto worked by assignment of the interest of
one partner to the others, but such assignment is evidence of dissolution if
known to the payee of the note. Id.
20. Where one pamtner withdraws from a firm, a note subsequently given in
the firm name by one of the remaining partners for a debt of the old firm, is
not binding on his copartners unless the new firm assumed the liabilities of ie
old firm. Id.
21. Where one partner makes his individual note to his own order, and en-
dorses it with his own name and then the name of the firm, and sells it through
a broker, appropriating the proceeds to his own use, the firm is liable thereon
to a bonafide purchaser from the broker. Redlon v. Chiurelhkll, 487.
22. Where one partner, without the consent of his copartner, brings suit in
the firm name, but the copartners take no steps to have it dismissed until a decree
entered in favor of the firm is reversed on appeal, they cannot claim relief
against the execution of the final decree. Harris v. Mosby, 755.
23. It makes no difference in such case that the acquiescence of the partners
was in consequence of ignorance of the law. Id.
24. A partner of a firm formed for an indefinite time may withdraw at any
time. Fletcher v. Reed, 249.
25. Declarations of one partner not made.in the presence of the other part-
ners nor subsequently assented to by them, are inadmissible as against them to
establish the partnership. Flournoy v. Williams, 486.
PART OWNER. See SHIPPING, 1.
PATENT. See FRAUD, I. UNITED STATES, 1.
1. afy be subjected by bill in equity to a judgment debt of the patentee.
.dger v. Murray, 469.
2. Upon such a bill the court may compel the patentee to assign or may ap-
point a trustee for that purpose. Id.
3. The question of the identity of the inventions described in the original
patent and the re-issue is one for the court and not for the jury, unless it ap-
pears from the face of the instruments that extrinsic evidence is needed to
explain terms of art or to apply the descriptions to the subject-matter. Heald
v. Rice, 487.
4. A patent for a machine cannot be re-issued for the purpose of claiming
the process of operating that class of machines. Id.
5. A claim can only be enlarged by a re-issue when an actual bonafide mis-
take has been inadvertently committed, and when it appears from a comparison
of the patent and the re-issue that there has been lacies in discovering the mis-
take and applying for the re-issue, the court may declare such re-issue invalid.
M 1iller v. Bridgeport Brass Co., 274.
6. A re-issue cannot be had for the purpose of expanding the claim to em-
brace an invention not specified in the original. James v. Campbell, 274.
7. A patentee cannot claim in a patent the same thing claimed by him in a
prior patent, nor what he omitted to claim in a prior patent in which the inven-
tion was described, he not having reserved the right to claim it in a separate
patent and not having seasonably applied therefor. d.
8. A patent for a machine cannot be re-issued -for the purpose of claiming
the process of operating that class of machines. Id.
9. The government of the United States has no right to use a patented in-
vention without compensation to the owner of the patent. Id.
10. Qnmre, whether an officer of the government can be sued for using an
invention only for and in belalf of the government, and whether the Court of
Claims is not the only tribunal in which such claim can be prosecuted. Id.
11. A bill for an account of profits merely, cannot be sustained. There must
be some other equity to which such relief is incidental. Root v. Lace Shore 4-
. S. Railroad Co., 550.
12. A specification is sufficiently clear when intelligible to a person skilled
in the art. Webster Loom Co. v. Higqins, 686.
INDEX. 859
PATENT.
13. Evidence is admissible to show the meaning of terms used in a patent.
Wtbstcr Loom Co. v. Higgins, 686.
14. If an improvement of a well-known appendage to a machine is fully
described in a specification, it is not necessary to show the ordinary modes of
attaching the appendage to the machine. Id.
15. (pe re, whether the defence of insufficient description can be set up
without alleging an intent to deceive the public. Id.
16. A new combination of well-known devices producing a new and useful
result, may be the subject of a patent. Id.
17. Of two original inventors, the first will be entitled to a patent unless
the other puts the invention into public use more than two years before the
application for a patent. Id.
18. An invention relating to machinery may be exhibited as well in a draw-
ing as in a model, so as to lay the foundation of a claim to priority. Id.
19. If the omission to set out in the answers he defence of prior invention,
is not objected to at the proper time in the court below, it cannot be objected
to in the Appellate Court. Id.
20. Where a patented improvement is required to adapt a machine to a par-
ticular use, and there is no other way of supplying the demand for that use,
the damages for infringement should be the entire profits made by the infringer
in that market. Goulds Man. Co. v. Coming, 623.
21. In such case it is error to restrict the damages to such profits as -iere
realized from the manufacture of the patented improvement as distinguished
from the profits realized from the whole machine as improved. Id.
22. The claim in letters patent cannot be enlarged by the language used in
other parts of the specification. Lfhigh Valley Railroad Co. v. Mellon, 77.
23. To constitute a public use of an invention it is not necessary that more
than one of the invented articles should be used, or that such use should he by
more than one person. And if the inventor permits such use without restric-
tion, it is a public use, notwithstanding that by the very character of the inven-
tion it is; only capable of being used where it cannot be seen by the public eye.
Egbcrt v. Lippman, 205.
PAYMENT. See BILLS AND NOTES, 12, 13.
1. The acceptance of the promissory note of a debtor for a pre-existing debt
secured by mortgage is only presumptive evidence of payment, and the ques-
tion is one of fact for the jury. Dodge v. Emer-son, 550.
2. In such a case it is not error for the judge to remark in his charge that in
the event of insolvency the old note and mortgage might be more valuable
than the new note. Id.
3. Payment of taxes under protest to an officer 4vho has a warrant for their
collection and threatens to collect by levy and sale, is not a voluntary pay-
ment. Ruggles v. City of Fond du Lac, 143.
4. Where one buying milk pays for each can on the supposition that it con-
tains eight gallons, when in fact it contains less, he may set off the money paid
for the shortage out of any sum lie may owe the seller. Devine v. Edwards,
205.
PENSION.
Taking from a pensioner more than the statutory price for obtaining a pen-
sion is per se unlawful, although there be no wrongful intention, and such ex-
cess may be recoverea of the taker in an action by the pensioner. Smart v.
IVIdte, 487.
PLEADING. See ARBITRATtON. ARR:sT, 2. CIMINAL LAw, 19. EQUITY,
10, 18, 19. FAUD , STATUTE OF, 6. INSUntAic, 12. LInEL, 2. M.%N-
DA.TUS, 2. USUrY, I.
1. In an action for trespass to land, a license must be specially pleaded.
Lichart v. Geir, 423.
2. Where goods sold are to be paid for in other goods or labor an action to
recover the same must be by special count. Slayton v. McDonald, 422.
3. The complaint should not anticipate and reply to matters of defence.
UI, v. Harvey, 118.
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PLEDGE. See CRIMINAL LAW, 24. CUSTOss, 1. EXECUTION, 6.
1. If a pledgee of a certificate of stock, with a blank power of attorney,
wrongfully assigns it as security for money loaned him, the sub-pledgee who
receives the stock in ignorance of the owner's equity, is entitled to hold the
stock as against the owner, to the extent of the consideration. Cherry v.
Frost, 57, and note.
2. An assignment of such stock as collateral, to replace other collaterals
surrendered, is an assignment for value. Id.
3. The assignee is not entitled to the benefit of subsequent payments upon
the stock made by the owner. Id.
4. A pledgee of stock may transfer the shares to his own name. Hubbell v.
Drexel, 452, and note.
5. Such pledgee is not bound to retain the identical shares if others of the
same kind are kept on hand. Id.
6. A receipted bill of chattels purporting to be security for a debt, is a pledge
and not a mortgage; and if the pledgee permits the pledgor to resume posses-
sion ad'd to hold them until his death, he cannot, by then taking possession of
them, defeat the right of the administrator to maintain against him an action
for their conversion. Thompson v. Dolliver, 815.
POSSESSION. See LANDLORD AND TENANT, 4.
1. Possession under an unrecorded deed or mortgage, is notice to the same
extent as if the instrument was recorded. Brainard v. Hudson, 686.
2. The record of a judgment in a summary process for the recovery of leased
premises by A. against B., is conclusive evidence against B. and his grantees
that lie was in possession at the time as tenant of A., and that his possession
extended to the boundary line of the demised premises. Richmond v. Stahle,
274.
PRACTICE. See ADMIRALTY, 10. BIr.L OF EXCEpIiqS, 1, 2. BILLS AND
NOTES, 10. Ca1ItINAL LAW, 14. EQUITY, 4, 13. TRIAL, 1, 2, 4.
1. In a joint action against two defendants for a tort, there may be a verdict
and judgment against one alone. Boswell v. Gates, 422.
2. Any judicial determination arrived at without notice and opportunity to
parties to be heard, is void. Wood v. Howard, 550.
3. A decree based on unsworn statements will be set aside. Id.
PRESCRIPTION. See EASEMIENT, I.
PRESUMPTION. See CRIIiNAL LAW, 7, 28-30. EXECUTORS, I. NEGLI-
GENCE, 4, 8. PARTNERSHIP, 14.
PUBLIC POLICY. See CONTRACT, 11. INFANT, 2. INSUIANCE, 11, 15.
SHERIFF'S SALE, I. TELEGRAPH, 10.
An agreement by a lumber dealer to pay to a builder a commission on sales
made to the builder's employers, is void as against public policy. Atlee v.
afnl:, 678.
RAILROAD. See COMMON CARRIER. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 23, 24. CoN-
TRACT, 14. CORPORATION, 8, 10. DAMAGES, 5, 6. EXPRESS COMPANY.
MASTER AND SERVANT, 8-11. MORTGAGE, 4, 5, 8-10. NEGLIGEINCE, 6-8.
RECEIVEE, 1-3, 7. SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE, 1.
1. Where by a stipulation on a passenger ticket, it is to be used on or befbre
a certain day, the ticket is good if presented within the time, although the
journey is not completed until after the time. Auerbach v. N. Y. Cent. Rail-
road Co., 790, and note.
2. Where a ticket binds the passenger to a continuous journey, he is not
bound to commence it at the starting point named in the ticket. Id.
3. Has exclusive right to track, and owes no duty to parents of young
children trespassing thereon. Cauley v. Pittsburgh. Cincinnati and St. Louis
Railway Go., 622.
4. Parents who permit their children to trespass on the track are guilty of
contributory negligence, even though the trespass was without their knowledge.
Id.
5. A railroad company, over whose road another company has by contract a
right to run trains, is liable for injury caused by the negligence of its switch-
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man to the employees ana property of the other company. In re Central 1ernont
Railroad Co., 687.
6. Is bound to provide for a careful lookout in the direction in which a train
is moving in places where people are likely to be upon the track. Towaley v.
C. I. and St. P. Railroad Co., 205.
7. Although a statute makes it unlawful to walk along a railroad track, it is
error to reject evidence that many pers-ons had for years been in the habit of
passing daily and hourly in the same pathway on which the injured person was
passing. Id.
8. The omission to ring a bell or sound a whistle as a train approaches a
erossing may be given in evidence, in an action for an injury at tile crossing,
without being specially pleaded. Goodwin v. Chicago, R. . ad P. Rail'oad
co., 685.
9. It is not negligence per se to run a train at the rate of twenty-five miles
an hour ocross a public road. Id.
10. The.fact that a train could not be stopped within the distance that the
headlight would show obstructions on the track, is not the true test of negli-
gence. Milion v. L. J- N. Railroad Co., 755.
1I. Grants to be satisfied out of sections along the line of a road give no
license to the grantees to roam over the whole public domain lying along the
road, but must be satisfied out of the nearest undisposed of sections which
meet the conditions named. MIood v. BI,.lington A- Mo. River Railroad Co.,
206.
RATIFICATION. See ATTOIN;Ey, 5. PARtTNERSHIP, 14.
RECEIVER. See CONFLICT OF LAWS, 1. LANDLORD AND TENANT, 5.
1. Receiver of railroad cannot, without leave of the court, be sued for
injury caused by the negligence of his employees. Baarton v. Ba'bour, 274.
2. Where questions of fact are involved the court may either allow the
injured party to sue the receiver in a court of law or direct a feigned issue. Id.
3. A court of equity may authorize a receiver to keep a road in repair and
operate it in the ordinary way. Id.
4. The court of another state has no jurisdiction without leave of the court
by which the receiver was appointed, to entertain a suit against him for a cause
of action arising in the state in which he was appointed. Id.
5. In a suit by a receiver on a note taken by his predecessor in office it is
no defence to show that the note was given as security for an unauthorized
loan of the trust funds by such predecessor. Cobn Y. De La Vergne, 687.
6. The rule that a receiver mus-t apply to the court before expending large
sums of money will not be so rigidly enforced as to work injustice where the
receiver has acted in good faith, and under such circumstances that previous
authority would have been g ranted on application. Brown v. Hazle urst, 77.
7. If the holder of railroad bonds desires to question the right of the
receiver to issue, under an order of court, certificates of indebtedness as a first
lien on the property, he must do so before such certificates have been issued
and sold to honafide purchasers. Hmpahlreys v. Allen, 275.
8. The courts of Rhode Island cannot appoint a receiver of a foreign cor-
poration doing business in that state. Stafford v. Atl. Mills Co., 206.
9. REcuv ns FOR Co-TENANTs, 761.
RECORDS.
The books used by a recorder of mortgages and the researches or memo-
randa of mortgages made by his clerks are dedicated to the public service afid
are not his private property. Herron v. AfcEner,, 206.
'RECOUPMENT. See SET-OFF.
RELEASE. See CONTRACT, 12.
REMOVAL OF CAUSES. See EQUITY, 7.
I. A corporation of one state operating a railroad in another state under a
lease, does not become a citizen of the latter state, and if sued therein may
remove the case to the federal courts. Bal. 6- Oho Railroad Co. v. Koontz,
143.
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2. Where in a federal court the evidence shows that there had been a collu-
sive transfer to give jurisdiction, it is the duty of the court, on its own motion,
to dismiss the suit. lWilliamns v. Township of Mottawa, 207.
3. To entitle a party to a removal under the second clause of the second
section of the Act of March 3d 1875, there must exist in the suit a separate
and distinct cause of action in respect to which all the necessary parties on one
side are citizens of different states from those of the other. f Uyde v. Ruble,
487.
4. The second clause of sect. 639 Rev. Stat. was repealed by the Act of
1875. Id.
REPLEVIN. See EVIDENCE, 5. SnsrrsNG. 1.
RESCISSION. See CONTRACT, 6, 10. INPANT, I. SIIERIFP'S SALE, 4.
RIPARIAN RIGHTS. See NEGLIGENCE, 9, 10. WATERS AND WATER-
COURSES, 1-3, 5.
SALE. See AssuBIrSIT. BILLS :%ND NOTES, 6. CONTRACT, S. DEBTOR AND
CREDITOR, 1-5, 21. FRAUD, 1-3. NrEw TRIAL, 3. TROVER, 1-4. UNITED
STATES CoumTs, 6. VENDOR AND VENDEE.
1. A lease by which the lessee, upon full payment of rent, is to receive a bill
of sale, is a conditional sale, and the vendee has an interest which he can uort-
gage. Carpenter v. &ott, 550.
2. Such mortgage is valid as against a creditor who attached immediately
upon the completion of the last payment. Id.
3. An agreement that, b' The subscriber has, this 21st day of December
1877, rented of H. (the plaintiff) one choral organ, during the payment of
rent as herein agreed, for the full rent of $190, payable as follows: one melo-
deon valued at $50, as first payment, and one note for $140, due January 15th
1879 ; with the understanding that if I shall have punctually paid all said rent
I shall be entitled to a bill of sale of the organ, and if I fail to pay any of said
rent when due, all my rights herein shall terminate, and said H. may take pos-
session of said organ," is not a lease but a conditional sale, and the vendor
cannot recover upon the $140-note after the organ had been returned, iline
v. Roberts, 206.
4. A buyerof an interest in a business who has ample opportunity to examine
the goods and the hooks, has no right to rely upon representations of the seller
as to value and amount of business. Poland v. Brownell, 350.
5. Where the breakage in transportation is not greater than the usual
breakage in goods of that character, the vendee cannot refuse to receive them.
flays v. Smith, 143.
6. A written contract of sale which does not show that it was made by
sample cannot be modified by proof that it was so made. Wiener v. Whipple,
143.
7. Where a known, described and defined thing is sold, there is no implied
warranty that it shall answer the purpose for which it is bought, even though
the vendor be the manufacturer and the purpose is stated by the vendee. Rasin
v. Conley, 756.
8. Where the vendee declares that he confides in the judgment of the vendor,
the latter, if he accepts the trust, is liable for unfair representations, even as to
things easily discernible on examination, but he is not liable for mistake of
judgment. Hanger v. Evins, 755.
9. If the vendor knowing the vendee to be inexperienced deceitfully induces
the latter not to inquire into the condition of the article, he is guilty of fraud.
Id.
10. If a vendor knowingly makes a false representation as to the fitness of
the article for the purchaser's business, he is liable to the vendee. Id.
11. When the vendor of property sold on trial agrees to examine the working
of the article and learn the result himself, the vendee need not notify him of its
failure. Gibson v. Vail, 77.
12. It is a species of fraud to sell an article on trial, when the vendor knows
or ought to have known that the trial must result in failure. Id.
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13. Conversations of the parties after the written contract is made, about the
setting up and manner of using milk pans sold on trial, are admissible. Gibson
v. Vill, 78.
SAVINGS BANK. See GIFr, 2. TAXATION, 10.
SCHOOL. See MtfNICIPAL CORPORATION, 10.
SEAL. See CONTnACT, 12. Li31uTATIONS, STATUTE OF, 2. MUNICIPAL
BONDS, 2.
SET-OFF. See EXECUTORS, 13. PAYVMENT, 4. UsuRy, 1. VENDOR AND
VENDEE, 6.
1. A motion that one judgment be set off against another is an appeal to the
equitable powers of the court, and i granting it the claim of the attorneys for
fees will be respected. Diehl v. Tdpster, 275.
2. A lboe fide purchaser in market overt of stolen cattle cannot, in an action
by the owner after conviction of the thief, set off a claim for the keep of the
cattle. Walloke v. ,lfatthvw., 574, avd note.
SHERIFF. See COxTm.%TPT, 1. SIIEnIFF'S SALE.
1. Sheriffs under writs directing in general terms the seizure of a debtor's
property must at their peril determine the ownership of the property seized,
hut under writs commanding the seizure of specific property they incur no
responsibility, and are bound only to look to the jurisdiction of the court and
to the proper execution of its mandates. Clavarie v. l'aggqarn'n, 207.
2. The sheriff of one county cannot make an arrest in another county except
on fresh pursuit in case of an escape, nor can he detain in such other county an
arrested prisoner except under a writ o hao&es coqwts. Page v. S taples, 207.
3. A sheriff is not obliged to travel sbout with an arrested prisoner to enable
the latter to procure bail. Id.
4. A person appointed in writing by the sheriff to act as deputy possesses
authority such as the sheriff himself may exercise. Turner v. Holtznan, 78.
5. The sheriff or his deputy may abate a public nuisance in a public high-
way, and in so doing may call other persons to his assistance. Id.
SHERIFF'S SALE. See EXECUTION, 5. INJUNCTION, 3, 4.
1. A contract between the defendant on an execution and a proposed pur-
chaser of his property whereby the defendant agrees not to have the property
run up, and the purchaser agrees to pay him the difference between the price
brought and one thousand dollars, is tbun',ed on sufficient consideration and is
not illegal. Matthon.s v. Starr, 481.
2. A renunciation by an insolvent debtor in favor of a particular creditor,
dispensing with'the forms of law, and by which the value of his property sold
under execution is diminished, is contrary to good morals, and a sheriff knowing
of the insolvency and dispensing with such forms in the sale is liable in damages
to other creditors. Tipery v. Hoaper, 143.
3. The price brought by the property so sold will not be taken as a standard
of its value. Id.
4. A creditor participating in the proceeds of a sheriff's sale is estopped
from attacking it, unless the participation was made in error of fhot, in which
case the creditor upon return of what he has received may, in a suit to whielt
all who participated in the proceeds are parties, have his participation rescinded.
Adasm v. Mouttan, 551.
5. Purchaser is liable only to the sheriff for breach of his contract of purchase.
People v. Stplle, 687.
SHIPPING. See AD.MIRALTY. BILL OF LADING. EQUITY, 3. NEGIA-
GENCE, 2.
1. A part owner of a vessel cannot maintain replevin for his undivided part,
although he own, a major interest in the vessel. Hackett v. Potter, 275.
2. A seaman discharged in a foreign port who is prevented by the conduct
of the master from making application to the consul, may recover in an action
at law against the master his proportion of the extra pay which sects. 4582 and
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4584 U. S. Rev. Stat. require the master to pay to the consul. Wlsun v.
Borstell, 488.
3. The provision of sect. 4513, Revised Statutes, that the fee of $2 required
to be paid to the shipping commissioner for each seaman shipped, under sects.
4511 and 4512, shall not be exacted, where, on the return of the vessel, the
sailor reships in the same vessel for another voyage, applies to re.shipments for
all voyages succeeding the first in regular order, and is not limited to the re-
shipment for the one voyage immediately following the one at which the fees
were paid. Young v. American Steamship Co., 551.
SLANDER. See HUSBAND AND WIFE, 26.
In an action of slander a refusal to charge that if plaintiff's general clarac-
ter was bad, that fact must be considered in estimating the damages, is error.
Campbell v. Campbell, 623.
SPECIFIC PERFOR.MANCE. See INSURANCE, 18.
1. Will be decreed of a contract by a railroad company to issue bonds where
the proceeding is an amicable one to test the power of the company to make
such issue. Phila. and Reading Railroad v. Sticter, 713.
2. May be decreed of part of lands with compensation for the residue, but
equity will not assume jurisdiction merely to award compensation where the
vendee knows that the vendor cansot convey. Bonner v. Little, 756.
3. Where specific performance is decreed of part, the price should be abated
in the propdrtion that the value of the tract is diminished by the deficiency.
Id.
4. Where the terms of a contract rest wholly or partially in parol, and spe-
cific performance is songht on tise ground of past performance, the terms must
appear clearly and unequivocally ; but the ftct tlsat the details of the agree-
ment are controverted by tlse parties will not deter the court from ascertaining
and giving effect to its terms. Mharton v. Stoutenburgh, 623.
5. Delivery of possession by a vendor or lessor accepted by the vendee or
lessee is such ass act of part performance as will take tlse contract out of the
Statute of Frauds, and justify a decree for specific performance. Id.
6. Courts of equity will not decree spebific performance of a contract of such
a nature that to carry the decree into effect would require their continued per-
sonal supervision, but a contract for a lease of mines to be worked in a speci-
fied manner, is not within this principle. The court can grant relief by a
decree that the lease be executed, leaving complainant to his legal remedy for
breaches of the covenants contained in it. Id.
STATUTE. See CONFLICT OF LAws, 4. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, I. EXECU-
TION, 7, 8. TRIAL, 3. UNITED STATES COURTS, 2, 3,
1. Will be construed in the sense in which it has been long enforced by the
departments of government. State v. Kelsey, 687.
2. Where excessive freight is collected during the existence of a stat-
ute making it unlawful, the repeal of tle statute will not prevent the recovery
of damages for such uslawful act. Graham v. C. I1. 6- St. P. Railroad Co.,
207.
STOCK. See CONTRACT, 4. CUST03e, I. GIFT, I. LIFE TENANT. PLEDGE,
1-5.
STOCK EXCHANGE.
Nature of right to seat in. N~ote to Smith v. Barclay, 408.
STOPPAGE IN TRANSITU.
The right of stoppage in transitu is not defeated by an attachment of the
goods after the termination of the transit, but while they still remain in the
carrier's hands. Mississippi Mills v. Undon 6- Planters' Bank, 534, and note.
STREET. See ACTION, 2. CONSUTTtIONAL LAw, 23. MUNICIPALCoRPos.A.
TION, 1, 3, 7, 11, 12, 22. NUISANCE. 2.
1. An obstruction of the sidewalk by cotton bales in front of a warelouse,
if continued longer titan is reasonably necessary for their transit into the ware-
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house, is a nuisance, and if a passer-by be injured thereby, the warehouseman
is liable. Maddox v. C'unnnaham, 4S8.
2. Even if such obstruction be continued only for ,. reasonable time, yet if
the bales be placed on the sidewalk so negligently as to caue injury to a
passer-by, the warehouseman is responsible. Id.
SUBROGATION. See EXECUTOnS, 10. NEGLIGENCE, 1. VENDOR AND VEx-
DEE, S.
1. If an heir to whom lands descend sells the same at private sale without
administration on the ancestor's estate, to a bona fide purchaser, who applies t!.c
purchase-money to discharge liens and preferred claims, such purchaser will be
subrogated to the rights of the holders of such claims. Sid ner v. fawVs, 275.
2. Mortgagee paying taxes may be subrogated by decree, to the rights of the
state as to lien, &e. ,Slrp v. Tlompsoa, 75.
3. An agreement for subrogation on payment of first mortgage by third per-
son at request of mortgagor, may be enforced against second mortgagee.
S rr-ce v. Hankinon, 75.
SUNDAY. See CRIMINAL L.tw, 4.
SURETY. See BILLtr AND NoTEs, 21. GUARDIAN AND WXRD, 1, 2. LIMITA-
TIOltS, STATUTE Or, 4.
1. A surety on a note is discharged by the addition of other sureties without
his knowledge. Berrynan v. Man r, 423.
2. After damages assessed on his bond the surety for an assignee for
creditors cannot object to a creditor's claim included terein which his been
allowed and included in the assignee's accounts. In re Estate of Stdle, 144.
3. The right of sureties to be relieved from responsibility for the future acts
or defaults of administrators or guardians is absolute and must be granted, but
where the sureties do not appear on the day set by the court for the hearing
their application may be dismisqed. Alln v. San;d-s, 114.
4. The omission of a company to collect monthly balances due from an agent
does not discharge the sureties on a bond given by the agent to the company for
fiithful performance of his duties. ratertown Rre I1S. Co. v. Simmons, 276.
5. An endorsement on a note of an agreement to reduce the rate of interest
is not an alteration of the note and does not discharge a surety of the maker.
Cawt)ridqe av. Bad.: v. Hyde, 276.
6. A surety on an administrator's bond cannot avoid liability by showing
that he signed upon an understanding with. the administrator made -known to
the probate court that another person as also to sign, and that the other per-
son never si-ned. Wolff v. Sclaeffer, 488.
7. If an administrator who has converted assets by pledging them for his
own purposes, tfail to recover them when he might, his conduct constitutes a
continuing breach, and if he has given an additional bond after the oriinal
conversion, but while lie might yet recover the assets, the suretits in both
bonds will be liable. Id.
8. The surety on an administrator's bond cannot attack collaterally a final
settlement from which there has been no appeal. Id.
9. Where two persons gave their joint note for money loaned on an agree-
ment known to the lender that each was to have one-half, it is not a case of
suretyship, and a verbal agreement by the lender on payment of one-half by
one maker to look to the other for the balance, is not binding. Small v. Older, 756.
10. Where the proceeds of mortgages executed to secure an individual note
and a joint note were ,not sufficient to pay both, the holder of the notes was
under no obligation to apply the sum realized upon both notes pro rata, but
might apply the entire sum upon the individual note. Id.
11. The giving of a bond as collateral to a subsistin_ bond and mortgage
does not, per se, suspend the right to proceed upon the latter, and a surety of
the mortgagor is not discharged thereby. Fireman's Ins. Co. v. Wilkinson, 621.
TAX AND TAXATION. See CONSTITUTIoN.A LAW, 7, 15. DEED, 5.
DomICILE. ERRORS AND APPEALS, 1. EXPRESs COMAPANY. MANDAMIUS, 3.
VOL. XXX.--109
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MVUNICIPAL CORPORATIN, 6, 17. PAYMENT, 3. SUBRnOGATIN, 2. TnEs-
PASS, 1.
1. It is entirely within the province of the legislature to determine the rules
of assessment of property and for the collection of taxes. State v. Board of
Assessors, 207.
2. The owner of real estate is not personally liable for taxes assessed against
another as owner. City o Jefferson v. Mock, 351.
3. An exemption of registered public debt from taxation by the laws of the
debtor state cannot affect the right of another state to tax such debt in the
hands of its own residents. Bonaparte v. Appeal Tax Court of Baltimore, 290,
and note.
4. The recovery by the state of a personal judgment against the owner of
land for taxes does not discharge a statutory lien for such taxes. People v.
Stahl, 276.
5. Under the Act of Congress of July 14th 1870, repealing the legacy tax,
personal property bequeathed to remaindermen after a life estate to testator's
widow, prior to the passage of the act, but not vesting in possession through
the death of the life-tenant until after the passage of the act, is not liable to
the tax. Mason v. Sargent, 624.
6. The interest of a citizen of Maryland residing in Baltimore, as part owner
of a vessel employed in foreign commerce, registered at Baltimore which is her
home port and the residence of her owners, is liable for annual taxes levied on
it by that city for municipal purposes. Guntherv. Aloyor, 5e., of Baltimore, 78.
7. The necessities of government and custom and usage have established a
procedure in regard to the levy and collection of taxes which, although differ-
ing from proceedings in courts of justice, is still "1 due process of law."
Kdly v. City of Pittsburgh, 78.
8. What parts of a state shall, for local purposes, be governed by a county,
a town or a city government, and the character of the land included in each,
are matters within the legislative discretion. Id.
9. When the taxes levied by a city upon land are clearly for a proper public
purpose, and are authorized by statute, the court cannot say that such statute
deprives the owner of his property without " due process of law," because the
land is farm land and does not reap the same benefits as land in the heart of a
city. Id.
10. The partial exemption from taxation allowed by sect. 3408 Rev. Stat.
to deposits in a savings bank having no capital stock, and operating without
profit to itself, applies to all deposits to the extent of $2000 each, and not
merely to deposits of $2000 or less. German Savings Bank: v. Archbold, 687.
11. The court of claims has jurisdiction of a suit to recover from the govern-
ment the amount of a claim for taxes illegally collected, which claim had been
duly presented to the commissioner of internal revenue and allowed under sects.
3220 and 3228 Rev. Stat. United States v. Real Estate Savings Bank, 423.
12. A claim presented to the collector within the period limited by sect. 3228
for prhsentation, is in time although not forwarded by the collector to the com-
missioner until after such period. Id.
13. Decisions of officers and tribunals, specially charged in tax laws, with
the duty of valuing property and equalizing the valuations, are final. Wagoner
v. Loomis, 423.
14. Even in cases of fraudulent discrimination equity will not relieve a tax-
paver whose property has not been taxed more than if a proper assessment bad
been made. Id.
15. Where it is reasonably certain that a demand for reduction will be
refused, such demand is not a prerequisite to a bill for relief against the col-
lection of the whole tax. Hill v. Nat. Albany Exchange Bank, 624.
16. The investments in foreign countries of part of the capital of a bank, if
of the character usually made by banks in doing a banking business, are liable
to taxation by the state in which the bank is incorporated. N"evada Bank v.
Sedgwick, 144.
17. Whether, if such investments had been made in fixed property subject
exclusively to another jurisdiction, a different rule would apply, not considered.
Id.
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IS. A provision in the charter of a corporation that it shall pay a tax on its
capital stock in lieu of all other taxes, exempts only the property necessary for
its business. Bank of Comnuze-ce v. State qf Tennessee, 351.
19. Portions of a bank's building leased by it to other parties, and lots bought
by it at a sale under a deed of trust made to it to secure a debt, are not within
such exemption. Id.
20. In the case of an ordinance authorizing a particular improvement, there
is a presumption that councils had determined that those who were specially
assessed would be specially benefited. Mayor and Councils of Baltimore v. Johs
Hopkins Hospital, 351.
21. The court cannot review such determination at the instance of the pro-
perty owners specially taxed. Id.
22. If, however, a local assessment should be so unequal as to become extor-
tion and confiscation, it would be the duty of the court to interfere. .d.
TELEGRAPH. See CONSTITUTINAL LAW, 15.
1. The message sent to a telegraph office to le transmitted is the original,
and the message received at the place to which it is transmitted is but a copy.
Snith v. Easton, 79.
2. The delivery of the original message at the office must ordinarily be
shown with proof of its authenticity. Where, however, the original has been
destroyed the copy may be admitted, but only upon proof that it is a correct
transcript of a message actually authorized by the party sought to be affected
by its contents. Id.
3. The rule which permits a letter to be admitted in evidence without other
proof of the handwriting than the fact that in due course it had been received
in reply to a letter which had been addresstd to the same party does not apply
to a telegram received in answer to another telegram. Id.
4. A telegraphic dispatch is a sufficient writing to take a case out of the Statute
of Frauds. Id.
5. A telegraph company is bound to perform its contract with integrity, skill
and diligence ; and if, by reason of the want of any of these qualities a message
be improperly transmitted, the company will be liable. Westera Union Tde-
graph Co. v. Blanchord, 351.
6. If it is necesary for the company, in transmitting messages with integrity,
skill and diligence, to have them repeated, the duty of so doing devolves upon
it, not upon the sender. Id.
7. The company cannot, by any regulation of its own, protect itself against
damages resulting from every degree of negligence except gross negligence or
fraud. Nor can it limit the damages to be recovered to a return of the amount
of toll paid. Id.
8. A message, "1 Cover two hundred September and one hundred August,"
was shown to be the ordinary expressions used in the cotton trade, meaning
that the person receiving the mcssage should sell for the sender two hundred
bales of cotton deliverable in August, and one hundred deliverable in Sep-
tember. Hed, that it was not such an obscure message as would limit the
u'ual liability of the company. Id.
9. Where an agent incurs a loss by the negligent transmission of a telegram,
the principal upon reimbursing him may recover from the company. Id.
10. The illegality of the contract would not relieve the company for liability
for its negligence. Id.
TENANT FOR LIFE. See LirE TENANT.
TORT. See DEBTOR AND CREcDITOR, 15. PRACTICE, 1.
It is an actionable offence for a married man to offer himself in marriage to
an unmarried woman, and a declaration in such action counting tortwise for
fraud is good. Polloek v. Sdlican, 79.
TRADEMARK.
1. A mere general description by words in common use of a kind of article,
or it, nature and qualities, cannot of itself become a trademark. Larrabee Y.
Levwls, 276.
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2. "Snowflake" as applied to bread or crackers is a mere description of
whiteness, lightness and purity. Larrabee v. Lewis, 276.
3. An arbitrary word not descriptive of the character or quality of the
article may become a trademark. Id.
4. In order to have a trademark protected by injunction it should appear
that the defendant's use of it was with the intent to mislead the public. Id.
5. A trade name of a firm is property to which the firm have an exclusive
right, and it may be assigned to a successor firm, who thereby obtain the same
right. Howard v. Park, 644, and note.
6. A dealer in a commodity identical with that dealt in by such firm will be
enjoined from the sale of such commodity in a wrapper countersigned with
such trade name even though the dealer purchased the commodity from a man-
ufacturer who was authorized to affix the trade name to goods designed for the
firm to which it belonged. rd.
TRESPASS. See CRMINAL LAW, 26, 32. HUSBAND AND WIFE, 25. MU-
NICIPAL CORPORATION, 11. PARTNERSHIP, 4. PLEADING, 1. WATERS
AND WATERCOURSES, 1.
1. A tax sale at another hour from that to which the sale had previously
been adjourned renders the officer a trespasser notwithstanding that the pro-
perty sold well and that plaintiff's attorney was present and said nothing.
Buzzell v. Johnson, 687.
2. A mere license may be by parol, and is a defence for actions committed
before its revocation, but the commencement of an action for damages by tie
licensor is a revocation. Lockhart v. G(cr, 423.
TRIAL. See CRnNAL LAW, 2, 14. EVIDENCE. LIBEL, 3. NEW TRIAL.
PATENT, 3. VERDICT.
1. In trespass for assault and battery, where issue was joined on an an-
swer justifying the trespass, the right to begin and close is in the plaintiff,
unless special reasons exist authorizing the court to change the order, but unless
it affirmatively appears that such special reasons do not exist the appellate court
will not reverse because the defendant was allowed to begin and close. Dille
v. Ingersoll, 144.
2. The court may allow the introduction of evidence after the conclusion of
the arguments of counsel. Darland v. Rosencrans, 551.
3. Whether a reversing act of the legislature is or is not a law is a question
for the court and not for the jury. Ainoskeag Nat. Bank v. Ottawa, 687.
4. A party may dismiss his case even after the court has indicated what the
instructions to the jury will be. Plullen v. Peck, 757.
5. Even in a case where it would not be improper to leave the case to the
jury the court may give a binding instruction if the evidence is not sufficient
to warrant a contrary verdict. Stewart v. Town of Lansing, 424.
6. It is error to charge that if the witnesses are equally credible the greater
number will be entitled to the greater weight. Birbacl v. Goodyear Rubber
Co., 424.
TROVER. See BAILENT, 3. INFANT, 1. PLEDGE, 6.
1. One purchasing chattels by means of a fraudulent representation that be
is the agent of another person, acquires no title thereto, and an innocent
vendee from him is liable in trover for the value of the chattels, less whatever
portion of the consideration was paid to the owner by the fraudulent purchaser.
Hanet v. Letcher, 144.
2. The vendor in a conditional sale cannot maintain an action of tort in the
nature of trover against an officer who, before payment, attaches the chattels
as the property of the vendee. Newhall v. Kinqsbury, 551.
3. A vendor who has been induced to sell by fraudulent representations of
the vendee, and who, before discovery of the fraud, has received part payment,
may maintain trover against a mortgagee from the vendee, without previous
demand or tender of the sums received. Warner v. VallilJ, 552.
4. In such case the part payment received may be retained as indemnity, to
be subsequently deducted from the amount of damages recoverable by the
vendor. ld.
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5. Where plaintiff has a qualified interest in the chattel, he is entitled only
to a sum sufficient to indemnify him and not to the whole value of the chattel.
Warner v. Vallily, 552.
6. One who has as'igncd a mortgtge as collateral and failed to tender the
debt and demand a re-assignment until after foreclosure by the assignee, can-
not then maintain trover in case of a refusal to assign. Rice v. Dillinglzam,
424.
TRUST AND TRUSTEE. See CH.RnITY. ControATiow, 25, 26. COSTS,
1, 2. GIFT, 2. PARTNERSHIP, 17.
1. Where a trustee refuses to account for profits, or has so mingled the pro-
perty with his own that lie cannot separate the profits, he will be charged with
compound interest. State v. Hoerarth, 277.
2. A trustee may appeal where the decree affects his commissions or where
he is interested in the fund, or where the question of the increase or decrease
of the whole fund is involved, but not where the contest is between creditors as
to their respective rights against each other. Fy v. Shrewsbury Sa. Inst.,
757.
3. Where, however, the trustee, in appealing, acted in good faith in pursu-
ance of what he supposed to be his duty, the costs will be paid out of the fund.
Id.
4. Trustees ordering work done under an order of court granting them an-
thority to do so, arc personally liable to the mechanics for the price of the 'work
unless the latter have agreed to look only to the trust funds. Gill v. Gariine,
79.
5. Where trustees have power to sell at their discretion and re-invest, a pur-
chaser is not bound to see to the application of the purchase-money. Van Bo:-
kelen v. Tinges, 757.
8. Where a deed conveyed land to the wife of the grantor for her use for
lit, provided that it should be used by the grantor's children, together with his
with as a b.ome, and at her death be divided among them, and with power in
the wife "at any time in her discretion to sell and convey the said property by
deed, provided the proceeds of such sale are invested in other real estate for
the uses expressed," a bonafide purchaser from the wife would not be bound to
see to the application of the proceeds. Gult v. Nlorthern, 277.
ULTRA VIRES. See CoRonRATox , 7-10.
UNDUE INFLUENCE. See LuNATIC, 5. WILL, 11-15.
UNITED STATES. See PATENT, 9.
1. A patent for land is conclusive as to all matters determined by the Land
Department when its action is within the scope of its authority, but such patent
may be collaterally impeahed in any action by showing that the department
had no jurisdiction. St. Louis S. S- PR. Co. v. Kemp, 352.
2. There is no'hing in the Acts of Congress which limits the size of a mining
claim for which E, patent may issue. The limitations in sects. 2330, 2331, Rev.
Stat. relate to locations and net to patents. Id.
3. The owner of contiguous locations may consolidate them into one and
present but a single application for a patent, such patent may be granted by
the Land Department. Id.
4. The courts have no appellate jurisdiction over the rulings of the Land
Department, nor can they reverse such rulings in a collateral proceeding where
there has been no fraud on or by the officers of the department. Quinby v.
Coula n, 552.
UNITED STATES COURTS. See AD.MIRALTY, I. CONFLICT or LAws, 2.
EQUITY, 7. ERIsORs AND APPEALS, 4-10, 16. JUDGMENT, 2. MUNICIPAL
BONDS, 3. REMOVAL or CAusrs. TAXATION, 11. UNITED STATES. 4.
1. In a cause removed to a federal court the competency of a witness is to
be determined by sect. 858 Rev. Stat., notwithstanding the fact that while the
ease was pending in the state court the witness had been declared incompetent
under the state law. King v. Worthington, 137.
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2. A statute of a state which has been held by its highest courts invalid
because not passed as its constitution directs, cannot be held valid by the federal
courts upon the same evidence. Amoskeag Nat. Bank v. Ottawa, 688.
3. The construction given by the Supreme Court of a state to a Statute of
Limitations of the state, will be followed by the United States Supreme Court
in a case decided the other way in the circuit court before the decision of the
state court. AMoores v. Citizens' Nat. Bank, 345.
4. A statutory proceeding under which, after a fruitless execution, a judg-
ment-debtor ib summoned before a judge or referee and compelled to make dis-
covery as to his ownership of property, is within the provision of sect. 916 U.
S. Rev. Stat., that the party recovering a judgment in a common-law cause in
any circuit or district court, shall be entitled to similar remedies upon the same
as are provided in like causes by the laws of the state in which such court is
held. Ex parte Boyd, 688.
5. Will follow the decisions of the state courts even on questions of commer-
cial law, if the party would otherwise be subjected to a double payment. Son-
stiby v. Keeley, 235, and note.
6. Whether in a common-law action involving the validity of a sale, the court
can apply the equitable principle that an innocent vendee, paving a portion of
the consideration after discovery of the fraud, will be liable to that extent.
Quwre, Id.
USURY. See CONTRACT, 5. CORPORATION, 10. NATIONAL BANK, 2.
1. One who has paid usury is entitled to have it deducted as an equitable
offset, without plea or answer. Cross v. Mann, 80.
2. Substituting new notes and a new mortgage for an old one does not change
the debt, and usury paid on the old debt may be deducted on ascertaining the
amount due on the last mortgage. Id.
3. When overdue notes are transferred, usury paid to the original owner
may be deducted. Id.
4. A. at the request and for the benefit of B., borrowed money and reloaned
it to B., under an agreement that A. should receive the same rate of interest
that he paid, and two per cent. for his expenses and credit. B. paid A. accord-
ing to contract, and A. paid the creditor. Held, that the money so paid was
not usury. Heldfurther, that whatever was paid in excess of the legal rate
during that portion of the time when A., by reasonable diligence could have
borrowed at six per cent., was usury. Bicker v. Clark, 688.
VENDOR AND VENDEE. See DAMAGES, 1. FixTurS, 2. IxsURAxcE,
23. Lis P ENenns, 2. MORTGAGE, 24. SALE. SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.
TROVER, 1-3. WARRANTY.
1. Where one sells land for cotton to be afterwards delivered, he has no lien
on the land for performance. Harris v. "faine, 424.
2. The taking of the secured note of a tlird person endorsed by the vendee
is a waiver of the vendor's lien. Kendricl; v Eggleston, 552.
3. Vendor's lien waived by taking collateral for the purchase-money. Ilett
v. Collins, 688. Boyer v. Austin, 688.
4. Debts for purchase-money barred by the Statute of Limitations cannot be
enforced by a vendor's lien. flett v. Collins, 688.
5. Where a vendor who has conveyed the land to the vendee but has a lien
for unpaid instalments of the purchase-money, sues for one of such instalments,
recovers judgment and sells the land under execution thereon, he cannot after-
wards enforce his vendor's lien for the remaining instalments. Dickason v.
Ely, 80.
6. A vendee who has made part payment, and who, to protect himself, buys
the title of his vendor at sheriff's sale, is not thereby relieved from his con-
tract of purchase, but may set off the amount so expended by him against the
balance of the purchase-money. English v. English, 815.
7. Rights of vendee in case of damage to property by fire before completion
of purchase. Note to Rayner v. Preston, 94.
8. One purchasing land for the benefit of another, and taking the deed in
the latter's name, stands in the place of the vendor, and is entitled to a lien for
purchase-money advanced for the vendee's benefit. Carey v. Boyle, 208.
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9. Where parties purehase from a common vendor who has laid out in the
rear an alley common to them all, but by their titles their lots run back only to
such alley, they receive no right except that of use to the land taken up thereby.
Bourke v. Perry, 207.
10. The assignee of a contract for the sale of real estate by accepting the
assignment becomes personally liable for the purchase-money. lVightan v.
Spofford, 424.
VERDICT. See ERRORS AND APPEALS, 17. Kalrw TRIAL, 1.
1. When arrived at by means other than conviction of judgment on the part
of the jury, will be set aside. Dreqtfis v. Lincoln, 552.
2. The mere fact that the ju-v has allowed plaintiff less than the evidence
shows him entitled to, if his theory be adopted, does not establish the fact that
the verdict was a compromise one. Id.
3. Circumstantial evidence can supply the place of direct proof only when
it points plainly to a particular conclusion, and can be reasonably explained
only upon such particular theory. Id.
VESSEL. See ADIRALTY. EQUITY, 3. FRAUDS, STATUTE OF, 1. NEGLI-
GENCE, 2. SnIPPING. TAXATION, 6.
VOLUNTARY CONVEYANCE. Se, DEaon AND CRDITOR, 6, 8. GIFT.
HUSBAND AND WIFE, 27.
VOLUNTARY PAYMENT. See PAYMENT.
WAGER. See CONTRACT, 4. INSUEANCE, 11. TFLEGRAPH, 10.
WAGES. See SmrING, 2.
WAIVER. See ARREsT, 3. CONTRACT, 10. CRtMNAL LAw, 2. INSURANCE,
6, 8.
WAREHOUSEMAXN. See STREET, 1, 2.
WARRSXNTY. See DAMAG'ES, 3. JuDiciAL, SALE, 2. SALE, 7, 8.
An outstanding equitable title is not a breach of warranty of title until it
is successfully asserted. Wilson v. Irish, 315.
WATERS AND WATERCOURSES. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 5. KEG-
LIGErNCE, 9, 10.
1. One who owns land on each side of a navigable stream above the tide
has the exclusive right to the ice formed thereon and may maintain trespass
against a stranger who removes such ice. laslinqton Ice Co. v. Shoeiall,
313, and note.
2. The measure of damages for cutting and removing such ice is the value
of the ice a, soon as it has been cut and prepared for removal. Id.
3. Riparian owners on a navigable stream cannot recover damages for a
diversion of the water by the state, or by a corporation acting by authority
of the state for the improvement of the navigation. Block.; Ri. Imp. Co. v.
La. C. Booning and Trans. Co. 424.
4. A deed of a tide-mill privilege, mill dam, wharf privilege, and the right
to flow the creek and adjoining lands to high-water mark, "and all the
rights and highways connected with and belonging to said mill privilege,"
gives the grantee no right to ice cutting nor title to the ice formed by
changing the dam so as to exclude the salt water. Dyer v. Corts, 80.
5. The right of a riparian owner to the water of a stream is not modified
by the fact that the flow of the stream has been increased by reservoirs. Siler
Spring B. ad D. Co. Y. 7ansk,cJ: Co., 815.
6. The right to take "exclusively all the sea manures and drift stuff which
lands on the West Shore, also to have the right of tipping the same and carting
away at their pleasure, by a road or way leading on the bank of said West
Shore clear of the gullies," does not embrace goods floated ashore from a wrecked
vessel, and is confined to such stuff as could be collected and legally appro-
priated, not such as must be held for or delivered to a known owner. Matson
v. Knowles, 816,
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7. A dam built without legislative authority across an arm of the sea, to
exclude the salt water for the purpose of creating an ice pond, is a public
nuisance. Dyer v. Curtis, 80.
8. Without such authority such dam never acquires the right to exist by
prescription. Id.
9. A lease by which the lessor agrees to keep up such dam is void, as against
public policy, and either party may set up its illegality. Id.
WAY. See EASEMIENT, 2-4.
WHARF. See NEGLIGENCE, 11.
WILL. See Coursa. LEGACY.
1. Where a legacy to a class takes effect in point of right at one time, and
in point of enjoyment at another, all will take who are embraced in the class
at the time of enjoyment. Jones's Appeal, 272.
2. A devise of " all" of testator's property is a devise of the fee. Plat v.
Sintoan, 269.
3. Where there is a devise in fee with a provision that if the devisee should
die without leaving legitimate heirs of her body the estate should go to persons
named, the fee taken by the first devisee is determinable only on the contingency
of her dying without leaving such heirs living at the time of her death. Id.
4. A bequest to the executors in trust for the separate use of testator's
daughter for life, "and from and after her death in trust for such child or
children as she may leave, his, her or their assigns forever, but if my said
daughter shall die leaving no children or child, then to my right heirs living at
the time of their death," creates an executory devise which vests on the death
of the life usee only in such of her children as survive her. Vhite v. Row-
land, 352.
5. Grandchildren cannot take under a bequest to children unless there be
something in the will to indicate such intention. Id.
6. A testator directed his executors to invest a fund and to pay to his widow,
for life or widowhood, one-third of the interest thereof, and to his children and
grandchildren, whom lie named, the remaining interest in designated portions;
that if any such child or grandchild should die without issue, the survivors
should take such decedent's share in like portions; that if any of them should
die leaving lawful issue over twenty-one years of age, the executor should pay
to the representatives of such decedent the principal on w: .ch such decedent
had received the interest. One child died during the lifetime of the widow,
leaving a daughter over twenty-one. Held, that the executors could pay her
the principal of her share on her producing tke widow's release of her interest
therein. Valentine v. Smith, 140.
7. If a description of a legatee applies to different persons, the executor may
maintain a bill of interpleader. Moss v. Stearns, 547.
8. In such case the costs, as between solicitor and client, of all parties to the
bill are payable out of the general estate. Id.
9. Extrinsic evidence is admissible to show testator's relation to and feeling
towards the respective claimants. Id.
10. A woman who had two nephews, one named Joseph White Sprague, and
the other Joseph Sprague Stearns, by her will bequeathed a legacy "to my
nephew, J. S. Sprague." Held, that the inference was that she intended
Joseph White Sprague. Id.
11. Fraud or undue influence in procuring one legacy in a will does not
invalidate other legacies, and a jury may find tbe will void as to the one legacy
and valid as to the other. Harrison's Appeal, 208.
12. That the draughtsman was made the executor and his relations received
a considerable portion of the estate devised, does not raise a presumption of
undue influence. Carter v. Dixon, 816.
13. If the testator is competent in mind, and makes tl e will freely and vol-
untarily, the fact that he has preferences, dislikes and unfounded prejudices,
will not avoid it. I'd.
14. Where the only relevancy of a difficulty is to show the state of feeling
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between parties, the fact of the difficulty may be admissible, but its particulars
are not. Carter v. Dieon, 816.
15. Undue influence must be established by other evidence than testator's
declarations, although they are admissible to show the extent and effect of such
influence. Busling v. Pusing, 816.
16. Upon a failure to establish a will after caveat, the court can only enter
judganei~t for costs against the propounder, and not against the legatees who
have aided him. Frances v. Holbrook, 277.
17. Whether one who propounds a will at the instance or for the benefit of
another can recover from the latter the costs, qucere, Id.
18. Costs of detective employed by the principal legatee, if his services were
valuable in establishing the will, may be paid out of the estate. In re Lewis,
816.
19. Where a will is destroyed with the connivance of part of the heirs, and
no copy is in existence, a devisee not a party to such destruction is only
required to show, in general terms, the disposition of property made by the
instrument, and that it purported to be testator's will, and was duly attested.
And rson v. Irwin, 277.
20. On a bill to establish a will destroyed after the testator's death, proof of
the sanity of the testator is not indispensable in the absence of counter proof,
and the disposition made by him of his property may of itself afford sufficient
evidence of his sanity. Id.
21. Semble, if a will be bona fide presented for probate, the costs, in cases
of rejection, should fall upon the estate. Id.
22. The title of a bonafide purchaser from an executor under a sale by order
of the probate court, will not be affected by the discovery of a later will.
Davis v. Gaines, 208.
23. W"hen the purchase-money, paid by a purchaser in good faith, of real
estate of a decedent ordered to be sold by a probate court, has been applied to
the extinguishment of a valid mortgage, and it turns out that the sale is irregular
or void, the purchaser cannot be ousted of his possession without a repayment
of the purchase-money so applied. Id.
WITNESS. See ARnST, 1. CInMINAL LAW, 12. EvimENcr, 14, 15, 20.
TRIAL, 6. UNITED STATES COUnTS, 1.
The fact that the witness is incompetent because he does not believe in a
Supreme Beivo cannot be proved by examining the witness, but must be shown
by his previous declarations. Searey v. M3iller, 811.
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